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SOME COMMENTS ON THE ROLE OF DISCRETION
IN MILITARY JUSTICE
ROBINSON 0. EvERTT*
An unpopular war has produced vehement criticism of the military establishment;
and military justice, a pillar of -that establishment, has not been immune from that
criticism. According to a book title, "Military Justice is to Justice as Military Music
is to Music."' From the more lofty position of the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice
Douglas has referred to "so-called military justice" and to "the travesties of justice
perpetrated under the 'Uniform Code of Military Justice."'" Legislative proposals
for reform of military justice have appeared from many quarters.3 And distrust of
military justice has led to judicial constriction of court-martial jurisdiction.
Central to many of the complaints against military justice is the great discretion
granted to military commanders in its administration. The following discussion has
as its purpose the identification of the diverse areas in which discretion is a pivotal
part of the military justice system. While the general approach here is descriptive,
attention is given to newly emerging limitations on discretion in the military.
I
DiscETioN OF THE COMMANSME IN CHEF
A. Sources of Presidential Discretion
I. Article II of the Constitution
Under Article II of the Constitution the President is vested with the "executive
power" and is "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,
and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of
the United States." 5 It is unnecessary to decide to what extent these constitutional
provisions would suffice of themselves to confer broad discretion upon the President
in the administration of military justice,' since Congress has delegated extensive
* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law; Lt. Col., USAFR.
'R. SHERRIuL, MILITARY JusTIcE Is TO JusTIcE AS MLT.ARY Music Is TO Music (i6).
2O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 266 (1969).
'E.g., Bayh, The Military Justice Act of 197z: The Need for Legislative Reform, zo AM. Cuam. L.
REv. 9 (97); Sherman, Congressional Proposals for Reform of Military Law, io Am. CraM. L. REv. 25
(971); U.S. COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS AND THE JUDGE AnvocA.T.s GENERAL, 1971 ANNUAL REPORT
5-2.'O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (i969); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (957); Toth v. Quarles,
350 U.S. I (1955); Latney v. Ignatius, 416 F.2d 82I (D.C. Cir. 1969).
5 U.S. CoNST. art. IT, §§ 1, 2.
'See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). For an argument that the Pres-
ident has a very broad constitutional power to regulate military justice, see Fratcher, Presidential Power to
Regulate Military Justice: A Critical Study of Decisions of the Court of Military Appeals, 34 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 861 (1959).
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power to the President. The scope of the power delegated depends, in part, on the
basis for his exercise of military jurisdiction in a particular case.
2. The Law of War
One source of military jurisdiction is the law of war-a branch of international
law. Thus, in Ex parte Quin7 the Supreme Court permitted trial by military
commission of eight spies who disembarked on the East Coast from German sub-
marines during World War II. Even though one of the spies claimed American
citizenship and the civil courts were available, the Court concluded that Congress
had authorized such trial pursuant to its constitutional power "to define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and offenses against the Law
of Nations."" By order, President Roosevelt had both appointed a military com-
mission to try the accused and prescribed regulations governing the trial procedure
and review of the case. The presidential order did not conform to the provisions
of the Articles of War for trial an'd appellate review in courts-martial. 9 Even so, the
Court upheld the Piresident's regulations.'0
Similarly, the Supreme Court sustained the jurisdiction of a military commission
which the Commanding General of the United States Army Forces, Western Pacific,
appointed in 1945 to try General Yamashita for alleged war crimes in the Philippine
Islands." Here again jurisdiction was predicated on the law of war and on
Congress' constitutional power to define and punish offenses against the Law of
Nations. Hostilities had terminated; but: a state of war continued, since peace had
not yet been proclaimed.' 2 The reguiationt prescribed by military authorities for
Yamashita's trial permitted use of affidavits and depositions under circumstances
when such evidence would not be admissible in a court-martial. However, in the
Court's opinion the military establishment had been left free by Congress to use the
rules of evidence it believed most appropriate.'
3
Courts created in connection with American military government of occupied
Germany were considered by the Supreme Court in Madsen v. Kinsella.4 Mrs.
Madsen, who was an American' citizen and the dependent wife of an Air Force
lieutenant, was fried and found guilty of murder by a United States Military Govern-
ment Court. This occupation court was deemed to be in the nature of a military
commission, and its'jurisdiction stemmed from the law of war. According to the
73I7 U.S. 1 (1942).
'U.S. CoNsr. art. , § 8, c. io.
317 U.S. at 22.
" 1d. at A7. Some members of the Court considered that Congress did not intend the Articles of War
to govern the procedures of a military commission convened by the President to determine questions
relating to admitted enemy invaders. Other Justices concluded that although the trial was subject to
whatever provisions of the Articles of War Congress had made applicable to "military commissions," the
Articles cited by the defense counsel did not foreclose the procedures which the President prescribed
or which the military commission was shown to have employed.
"I1n re-Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (946).
" Id. at z2.
"Ild. at 18-23.
14 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
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Court, military commissions "have been called our common-law war courts. They
have taken many forms and borne many names. Neither their procedure nor
their jurisdiction has been prescribed by statute."'" With respect to military com-
missions the Supreme Court also noted:
In the absence of attempts by Congress to limit the President's power, it appears
that, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, he may,
in time of war, establish and prescribe the jurisdiction and procedure of military
commissions, and of tribunals in the nature of such commissions, in territory occupied
by Armed Forces of the United States. His authority to do this sometimes survives
cessation of hostilities .... The policy of Congress to refrain from legislating in
this uncharted area does not imply its lack of power to legislate. That evident
restraint contrasts with its traditional readiness to "make Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; ....." Under that clause Congress
has enacted and repeatedly revised the Articles of War which have prescribed,
with particularity, the jurisdiction and procedure of United States court-martial.'
e
The Court ruled that Article of War 15, as it then existed, provided a concurrent
jurisdiction for courts-martial and military commissions with respect to violations
of the law of war; and military commanders had the discretion to choose which type
of tribunal they would employ.'
In Quirin, Yamashita, and Madsen the Supreme Court was applying the law of
war in connection with a declared war, and perhaps these decisions might be limited
by that fact.'" However, in those situations where the law of war can properly be
invoked, Congress has continued to provide military commanders 'with a[ choice
between courts-martial, which are subject to the procedures and safeguards of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice anl the Manual for Courts-Martial, and military
commissions, for which the President as- Commander-in-Chief and his subordinate
.ommanders can make rules of evidence and provide for-trial procedure on an ad hoc
basis.
Under Article i8 of the Uniform Code, general courts-martial "have jurisdiction
to try any person who by the law of war is subject to trial by a military tribunal and
may adjudge any punishment permitted by the law of war."'" Article 212°--in•
wording almost identical to that of the corresponling Article of War 15 which was
x Id. at 346-47.
1 Id. at 348-49:
"'Id. at 345-55. Cf. United States v. Schultz, i U.S.C..A. 512, 4 C.M.R. 104 (1952).
" Cf. United States v. Averette, i9 U;S.C.M.A. 363, 41 C.M.RL 363 (1970), discussed in 49 N.C.L.
REv. I88 (1970). There the Court of Military Appeals ruled that Article 2(1o), which "in time of
war" extends military jurisdiction to civilians "serving with or accompanying an armed force in the
field," applied only in the event of a declared war. See, also Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228 (1959).
"0 Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. i8, io U.S.C. § 818 (1970) [hereinafter referred to. as
U.C.M.J.]. Since this express provision invoking the law of war appears only in the article concerning
the jurisdiction of general courts-martial and is not contained in the comparable articles of the Uniform
Code which deal with the jurisdiction of special and summary c6urts-martial (U.C.M.J., arts." 19-20,
io U.S.C. §§ 819, 82o [1970]) there may arise a negative implication that special and summary courts-
martial were not intended to possess any jurisdiction under'the law of war.
.0 U.C.M.J., art. 21, io U.S.C. § 821 (970).
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in effect at the time of Quirin and Yamashita 2 1--provides that the jurisdiction of
courts-martial does "not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other
military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses
that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by" such courts. Under Article
36 the President may prescribe rules for the "procedure, including modes of proof,
in cases before courts-martial, courts of inquiry, military commissions and other
military tribunals."-2  Refusal to appear or to testify "before a court-martial, military
commission, court of inquiry or any other military court or board" is made punish-
able by Article 47 of the Code;2  and a "court-martial, provost court, or military com-
mission may punish for contempt any person who uses any menacing word, sign, or
gesture in its presence or who disturbs its proceedings by any riot or disorder."24
Under certain circumstances the sworn testimony contained in the record of pro-
ceedings of a court of inquiry may "be read in evidence by any party before a court-
"21martial or military commission."" Moreover, both Article 104,20 which proscribes
aiding the enemy, and Article io6,27 which concerns spies in' time of war, authorize
trial by court-martial or military commission. Each article clearly is based on the law
of war; and unlike the other punitive articles of the Uniform Code, each applies to
"any person" and not merely to persons subject to the Uniform Code.
3. Martial Law
The broad discretion available to the Comman'der-in-Chief and his subordinates
in dealing with offenses against the law of war--offenses for which even civilians can
be tried by military tribunals-involves the atypical situation. Also atypical is the
exercise of military jurisdiction pursuant to martial law, when civil courts cannot
carry on their functions.29 Martial law is a doctrine of necessity; and if the necessity
exists, the use of military personnel and military tribunals is permissible to maintain
order. However, the imposition of martial law must have some basis in fact °
4. Congressional Delegation
Military jurisdiction is usually based on the Uniform Code of Military JusticeS1
which Congress enacted pursuant to its conttitutional power "to make Rules for
See 327 U.S. at i9-2o.52 U.C.M.J., art. 36, xo U.S.C. § 836 (1970). Similar wording was contained in Article of War 38
which was in effect when Quirkn and Yamashita arose. Act of June 4, 392o, ch. 227, VII, § x, 41 Stat.
794. Apparently it left the President free to provide quite different rules for military commissions than
those which he prescribed to regulate trials by court-martial.
5 3U.C.M.J., art. 47, zo U.S.C. S 847 (3970).
*' U.C.M.J., art. 48, 3o U.S.C. § 848 (3970).
U.C.M.J., art. 5o, 3o U.S.C. § 85o (3970).
oU.C.M.J., art. 104, 1o U.S.C. § 904 (3970).
5 7U.C.M.J., art. xo6, xo U.S.C. § 9o6 (1970).
2 U.C.M.J., arts. 77-334, 1o U.S.C. §§ 877-934 (3970).
"See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (3946); Ex parte Milligan, 71 US . (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
"oSterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (3932).
"The Code was originally enacted on May 5, 395o, and was contained in ch. 169, 5 1 (Arts. 3-i40),
64 Stat. 108-45. In 1956, it was recodified, 7oA Stat. 36-78, 10 U.S.C. §H 801-940 (1970).
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the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."
2 In Article 36 of the
Code, Congress has made a broad delegation of power to the President in these terms:
(a) The procedure, including modes of proof, in cases before courts-martial,
courts of inquiry, military commissions, and other military tribunals may be pre-
scribed by the President by regulations which shall, so far as he considers practicable,
apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the
trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts, but which may not be
contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter.
(b) All rules and regulations made under this article shall be uniform insofar
as practicable and shall be reported to Congress.
33
In exercising this power delegated by Article 36 and its predecessor statutory pro-
visions, various Presidents have issued Executive Orders which prescribed Manuals
for Courts-Martial. 4 Similarly, from time to time Presidents have, in their dis-
cretion, amended a Manual for Courts-Martial by Executive Order.3 5 The term
"modes of proof" that appears in Article 36 might be interpreted to mean only rules
of evidence. However, since the same article also uses the phrase "rules of evidence,"
it is arguable that "modes of proof" has a broader scope. And this probably has been
the view of the military establishment3 6
For decades, successive Manuals for Courts-Martial have contained discussions
of the various punitive articles-first as they were in the Articles of War and more
recently as the punitive articles appear in the Uniform Code. If "modes of proof,"
as used in Article 36, is intended to include these discussions of the punitive articles,
"' U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, d. 14.
Up to this point the Supreme Court has refused to permit the Code's application to persons wfi
were not members of the armed forces both at the time of the offense and the time of trial. Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. I (1955), held unconstitutional Article 3(a) of the Code, 1o U.S.C. § 803(a) (1970),
insofar as it sought to retain military jurisdiction to try a former serviceman for offenses committed
while he was on active duty. McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 36 U.S. 281 (196o); Wilson
v. Bohlender, 361 U.S. 281 (196o); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (ig6o); Kinsella v. United States
ex. rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (sg6o); and Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. I (1957), establishsed that military
jurisdiction does not extend to either civilian dependents or employees who accompany the armed
forces overseas in time of peace. The Court has not yet expressly considered the constitutionality of
Article 2(1o), 10 U.S.C. § 8o(1o) (1970), which subjects to trial by court-martial civilians who accom-
pany the armed forces in the field in time of war. See note i8, supra. Nor has the Court yet over-
ruled its 192o holding that discharged military prisoners may be amenable to military jurisdiction. Kan
v. Anderson, 255 U.S. I (192o).
" U.C.M.J., art. 36, 1o U.S.C. § 836 (1970). A predecessor of the article was enacted in 19x6 as
part of the Articles of War, applicable to the Army. See Fratcher, supra note 6, at 864.
"Exec. Order No. 11476, 34 Fed. Reg. o5o2 (1969) (prescribing the MANUAL FOR COuRs-MARTIAL,
UNITED STATES [rev. ed. 1969]); Exec. Order No. 11430, 33 Fed. Reg. 13502 (1968) (prescribing the
MANUAL FOR COURTs-MARIAL, UrNTED STATrES [1969]); Exec. Order No. 10214, 16 Fed. Reg. 1303
(z951). Pursuant to the Articles of War the President issued Manuals for Courts-Martial in 1917, 1921,
x928, and 1949, which were reported to Congress. Fratcher, supra note 6, at 865.
" See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 10247, 16 Fed. Reg. 5035 (1951) (suspending the limitations for violations
of Articles 82, 85, 86(3), 87, 9o , 9i(i) and (2), 113, and iI5 of the U.C.M.J.); Exec. Order No. io628,
2o Fed. Reg. 5741 (1955) (restoring limitations upon punishments); Exec. Order No. 10565, 19 FED.
Reg. 6299 (954) (amending certain maximum punishments); Exec. Order No. io652, 21 Fed. Reg.'235
(1956) (amending provisions concerning automatic reduction in certain sentences).
" Ile Court of Military Appeals has taken the position that "modes of proof" in Article 36 means
only "rules of evidence." United States v. Worley, i9 U.S.C.M.A. 444, 445, 42 C.M.R. 46, 47 (1970).
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then the President has been delegated some discretion to choose between competing
rules of substantive criminal law concerning the offenses proscribed in those articles.
Since the Constitution confers on Congress, not the President, an express power
"to* make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,"
a question arises as to Congress' right to delegate this power to the President. In
several instances the question has been rendered moot by judicial rulings that the
Manual's discussion of a particular offense was contrary to the legislative intent
revealed by the Uniform Code3 Three different Manuals for Courts-Martial have
been promulgated by Presidential Executive Order since enactment of the Uniform
Code.3 8 As contemplated by Article 36 of the Code, Congress has been informed
of the existence of these Manuals, which have remained relatively constant in their
discussions of the various punitive articles. The failure of Congress to repudiate the
Manual interpretations of those articles might be considered as implied ratification
of the President's action, in which event it would be unnecessary to determine if the
,President had been properly delegated authority in the first instance to interpret the
punitive articles.
This issue'of presidential authority to participate in defining crimes is especially
important with respect to two punitive articles which-as various critics have com-
plained 3g--are especially sweeping in their terms.. Article 133, which applies only
to commissioned officers, cadets, and midshipmen, proscribes conduct unbecoming an
officer and gentleman ° Article i34-- codified under the heading "General Artidcle"-
apglies to All military personnel and prohibits "all disorders and neglects to the
prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature
to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital."41
Although the point has sometimes been misunderstood,42 the third category of mis-
8rUnited States v. Horton, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 469, 26 C.M.R. 249 (1958) (larceny); United States v.
Welker, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 647, 25 C.M.R. I51 (x958) (larceny); United States v. Johnson, 7 U.S.C.M.A.
.488, 22 C.M.R. 278 (1957) (unauthorized absence and desertion); United States v. Jenkins, 7 U.S.C.M.A.
26x, 22 C.M.R. 51 (1956) (fraudulent enlistment); United States v. Huff, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 247, 22 C.M.R.
37 (1956) (desertion); United States v. Rushlow, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 641, io C.M.R. X39 (x953) (desertion).
These decisions are criticized in Fratcher, supra note 6, at 871-78.
In 195r, by President Truman; in 1968, by President Johnson; and in 1969, by President Nixon.
,See note 34, supra.
" See, e.g., O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265-66 (1969); Gaynor, Prejudicial and Dis-
creditable Military Conduct: A Critical Appraisal of the General Article, 22 HAsr. L.J. 259 (971). But
see Wiener, Are the General Military Articles Unconstitutionally Vague?, 54 A.B.A.J. 357 (x968). For a
criticism of some of the applications of Article 134, see Everett, Article z34, Uniform Code of Military
"Jutic -- A Study in Vagueness, 37 N.C.L. Ray. 142 (x959). The 1971 Annual Report of the Court
of Military Appeals and the Judge Advocates General proposed that Congress consider legislation to
"restrict the scope of Article 134 by enacting separate punitive articles of the code covering selected
offenses now dealt with by Article 134, and by limiting the. maximum punishment for other conduct
prejudicial to good order and discipline or service-discrediting conduct to confinement and forfeitures for
.6 months." 1971 AwNuAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
'°U.CM.J., art. 133, 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1970).
'U.C.M.J., art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (197o).
"5 A Senate Report erroneously assumed that a violation of the law of a foreign country would
automatically constitute a violation of the Uniform Code. See R. Eva'rr, MILIrARY JusTe Ir Ti
Aldm FoRcEs OF T= UNm STATES 4X (1956).
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conduct--"crimes and offenses not capital"-is deemed to incorporate by reference
conduct which would constitute a violation of criminal provisions of federal statutes
other than the Uniform Code itself.43 As to this category the President has no
opportunity to participate in defining the crime.
On the other hand, the first two categories of misbehavior--disorders and service-
discrediting conduct-are so inexact that they even raise the specter of unconstitu-
tional vagueness 4 The Manual for Courts-Martial, prescribed by Presidential
Executive Order, has been employed as a means for imparting greater specificity
to these two broad statutory standards, as well as to the standard of "conduct un-
becoming an officer and gentleman," which is utilized in Article 133. The specificity
is obtained in two ways-first through the Manual discussion of the two punitive
articles45 and also by setting out in a Manual appendix form specifications indicating
how variobs offenses should be alleged under Articles 133 and i34-46 In substance,
then, various Presidents in promulgating different Manuals for Courts-Martial have
made determinations of substantive law as to the types of conduct which should be
punishable under the broad wording of these two punitive articles.
Up to this point Congress has not interfered overtly with the President's pre-
rogative in this regard; indeed, in enacting the Uniform Code in i95o and the
Military Justice Act of I968,47 that body revealed no desire to change the use of
Articles 133 and 134. On the other hand, the Court of Military Appeals, while
sometimes permitting extensions of these two articles,48 developed a doctrine of pre-
emption to the effect that Article 134 may nbt be employed to punish areas of
conduct which were the subject of other punitive articles in the Uniform Code39
Article 92 of the Uniform Code makes punishable the failure to obey "any law-
ful general order or regulation.:" As Commander-in-Chief the President may himself
issue such an order or regulation, or he may direct that it be'issued by one of his
subordinate commanders. By promulgating orders and regulations, the President
may add substantially to those rules which military personnel may disobey only at
their peril. In a sense, Article 92 delegates to the President, and other military com-
manders a part of Congress' constitutional power to "make Rules for the Government
and Regulation of th& land and naval Forces."5
Article 36 directs the President to apply, "so far as he considers practicable," the
"MANUAL FOP. COtIETs-MAI.TXAL, UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 1969), 213e [hereinafter cited as MA-
UAL],
" As to possible vagueness of Article 134, see United States v. Frantz, 2 U.S.C.M.A. i61, 7 C.M.R.
37 (W953); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (2o H6w.) 65 (1857); Everett, supra note '39:-
!" MANUAL, J 22, 213.
" MANUAL, app. 6c. Forms r22-25 concern Article X33; forms 126-88 are for use -under Article 134.
"Act of Oct. 24, 1968, Pub. L. 9o-632, 81 Stat. 1335-43. ".
8 See, e.g., United States v. Hooper, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 637, 26 C.M.R. 417 (1958); United States v.
Berry, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 609, 20 C.M.R. 325 (1956). See generally, Everett, supra note 39.
"United States v. Norris, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 236, 8 C.M.R. 36 (953); United States v. Johnson, 3
U.S.C.M.A. 174, ix C.M.R. 174 (1953).
80U.C.M.J., art. 92, 10 U.S.C. § 892 (1970).
"1 U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, d. 14.
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rules of evidence used in -the federal district courts. 2 However, the President's
determination of practicability seems nonreviewable, unless it clashes with a specific
provision of the Uniform Code or the Constitution. Thus, the President was upheld
in his choice of a rule governing corpus delicti--corroboration of confessions-which
proved to be different from that utilized in the federal district courts and more
favorable to the accused." It is illustrative of the President's discretion to amend
Manual provisions that the x969 edition of the Manual for Courts-Martial changed
this rule of evidence governing corroboration to bring it into line with the federal
practice. Ironically, in' dealing with self-incrimination, the Court of Military
Appeals concluded that a Manual rule of evidence which later proved to be in
accord with the federal rule55 was invalid because of conflict with provisions in the
Uniform Code. 6
The rules of character evidence prescribed by the President differ from those
applied in many courts, since they permit proof of a person's character not only by
testimony as to his reputation but also by testimony about the witness's own opinion
of his character."7 No privilege is recognized by the Manual for Courts-Martial with
respect to communications of a patient either to a military or a civilian physician. 5
A certificate or statement concerning a comparison of fingerprints may be in-
troduced in evidence without calling as a witness the person who made the com-
parison. 9
For the military establishment one of the most helpful rules of evidence prescribed
by the President in the Manual for Courts-Martial authorizes admission of official
records as an exception to the hearsay rule.60 Proof of unauthorized absence-prob-
ably the offense most frequently tried by court-martial-is usually accomplished by
introduction in evidence of official personnel records reflecting the absence. How-
ever, admissibility of an official record of a fact or event depends on the existence
of an official duty to record that fact or eventP' The President as Commander-in-
" U.C.M.J., art. 36, io U.S.C. § 836 (1970).
"'United States v. Smith, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 105, 32 C.M.R. 1o5 (x962) (extensive discussion of power
delegated to the President under Article 36); United States v. Mims, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 36, 24 C.M.R. 126
(x957); United States v. Villasenor, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 19 C.M.R. 129 (x955).
" MANUAL, 140a(5). Similarly the Manual was changed in 1969 to allow presentencing considera-
tion of nonjudicial punishments the accused received. MANUAL, 75c(4). See United States v. Worley,
x9 U.S.C.M.A. 444, 42 C.M.R. 46 (197o); United States v. Johnson, x9 U.S.C.M.A. 464, 42 C.M.R.
66 (1970).
"' Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (x967); Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (I966).
"' United States v. Musguire, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 67, 25 C.M.R. 329 (1958); United States v. Rosato,
3 U.S.C.M.A. 143, 11 C.M.R. 143 (I953); United States v. Eggers, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 19i, I1 C.M.R. 19%
(953); United States v. Greer, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 576, 13 C.M.R. 132 (1953).
"'MANUAL 138f(x). Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 405(a) adopts the same view as the
military rule. 93 S.Ct. 37 (z973).
5 8
MANUAL, zsic(). Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 504 provides only for a psychotherapist-
patient privilege and does not provide a privilege generally. 93 S.Ct. 55 (z973).
" MANUAL, 143a(2) (f).
"0 MANUAL, t 144b.
"' Id. See also United States v. Kitchen, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 541, 18 C.M.R. 165 (1955); United States
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Chief is empowered to impose duties to record various facts and events. By creating
a duty to prepare a record, he makes that record admissible in evidence. On various
occasions the power to change record-keeping requirements has been utilized by
military commanders to facilitate proo2 of certain offenses. 2
A striking feature of the Uniform Code is the provision in most of its punitive
articles that upon conviction an accused "shall be punished as a court-martial may
direct." 3 Since a few of the punitive articles state that the accused "shall be pun-
ished by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct,"
6 4 it would
appear on their face that most of the punitive articles would permit imposition of life
imprisonment. Congress, however, has specifically authorized the President to
prescribe limits on the punishment for an offense;"5 and undoubtedly it contem-
plated that such limits would be imposed by the President for many types of offenses.
The Manual for Courts-Martial contains a detailed Table of Maximum Punish-
ments; 6 and so the President, rather than Congress, possesses the discretion to
prescribe the maximum punishments imposable for most offenses. Furthermore,
especially with respect to combat areas, a President has sometimes removed the
limitations on maximum punishments for certain offenses.6 T In that event, the
maximum punishment reverts to confinement for life.
Although it would be unusual for him to do so, the President is empowered by
the Uniform Code to convene a court-martial.68 His approval of certain sentences is
required;" he may commute sentences;70 he possesses a constitutional authority "to
grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States"--which would
include violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. With the advice and
consent of the Senate, the President appoints all "Officers of the United States
' 7 - -
among them the officers of the military establishment and the civilian judges of the
Court of Military Appeals.
B. Practical and Legal Limitations of Presidential Discretion
To complete the survey of the President's discretion with respect to military
justice, some of the practical and legal limitations of that discretion should be men-
v. Bennett, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 309, i5 C.M.R. 309 (1954); United States v. Wilson, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 15 C.M.R.
3 (1954)-
" See United States v. Simone, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 146, i9 C.M.R. 272 (I955); United States v. Kitchen,
5 U.S.C.M.A. 54, 18 C.M.R. 165 (1955).
"U.C.M.j., arts. 77-134, 10 U.S.C. §§ 877-934 (197o).
" See U.C.M.J., arts. 85, 90, 94, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 113, 118, 120, 1o U.S.C. §§ 885, 890, 894,
899, 9oo, 901, 902, 904, 913, 918, 920 (ig7o). Article xo6, io U.S.C. § 9o6 (970), which concerns
spies, provides a mandatory death sentence.
' U.C.MJ., art. 56, zo U.S.C. § 856 (1970). See also U.C.M.J., art. 36, 1o U.S.C. § 836 (1970).
"MANUAL, 127b.
", See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 10247, z6 Fed. Reg. 5035 (1951).
0sU.C.M.J., arts. 22-24, io U.S.C. §§ 822-24 (1970).
" MANUAL, 98, zooe(2).
7
o MANUAL, t 1o5a.
71 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2.
72 rd.
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tioned. For example, Congress may amend the Uniform Code and, in so doing, may
set aside rules which the President in his discretion has provided in the Manual for
Courts-Martial. Furthermore, even with respect to offenses against the law of war,
Congress apparently would be perfectly free to impose limitations on the Pres-
ident's discretion-for example, his discretion to use military commissions rather
than courts-martial. -Congress' constitutional power over the military budget also
serves as a powerful restraint on presidential discretion in all matters pertaining to the
military establishment.
78
Congress has well-staffed committees whose existence facilitates its efforts to
impose reins on the Commander-in-Chief and his military subordinates. In fact, the
extensive inquiries made by the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights into
the rights of military personnel caused it to be likened to a military ombudsman,
as that post exists in West Germany.'4 To maintain its access to information, Con-
gress has specifically prohibited any effort by the military establishment to restrict
communication by service personnel with members of Congress 5
Judicial decisions have also limited the potential role of presidential discretion
in the administration of military justice. Thus, the Court of Military Appeals has
established that military personnel do possess constitutional rights.P Therefore, the
President and his subordinate military commanders may not take action which
denies those rights.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has restricted military jurisdiction both as to
persons and offenses. Ex-servicemen are not subject to court-martial for offenses
prior to discharge.7 And civilian dependents and employees 'also fall outside the
scope of military jurisdiction18 Of special importance is O'Callahan v. Parler,79
which held that even as to military personnel military jurisdiction was lacking over
offenses that were not service-conn'ected. ,
The full impact of O'Callahan remains unknown. For example, the concept
of service-cotinection his not yet been fully clarified, although the Supreme Court
has since ruled that an offense committed on a military post-is service-connected.80
The opinion of the Court in O'Callahan placed great emphasis on the unavailability
73U.S. CoNsr. art. I, §.8, cd. x2, 13.
"' See Hearings on S. Res. 260 Before the Subcomm. on Constitttional Rights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 822 (1962) (testimony of Frank E.G. Weil) [hereinafter cited as
z962 Hedrings].
7 10 U.S.C. § 1034 (1970). See also United States v. Schmidt, x6 U.S.C.M.A. 57, 36 C.M.R. 2x3
(1966).
" The Court of Military Appeals is a court composed of three civilian judges appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate and was provided for by Article 67 of the Uniform
Code, io U.S.C. § 867 (1970). More than a decade ago it proclaimed that "the protections in the Bill
of Rights, except those which are expressly or by necessary implication inapplicable, are available to
members of our armed forces." United States v. Jacoby, xi U.S.C.M.A. ,428, 430, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246
(x96o). See also United States v. Tempia, x6 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
" Toth v. Quarles, 35o US. II (1955).
71 See note 32 supra.
79395 U.S. 258 (1969).
Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (197).
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of the protections of jury trial and grand jury indictment in courts-martial 8s In light
of that rationale, it is unclear whether O'Callahan applies to offenses committed
in other countries where jury trial and grand jury indictment are unavailable in the
civil courts. 2 Similarly, petty offenses have been' held not to fall within the rule of
O'Callahan, since there is no constitutional right to jury trial or grand jury indictment
for such crimes.' Furthermore, a question remains as to whether O'Callahan would
have reached a different result in time of war, declared or undeclared.
The opinion in O'Calhzhan was also concerned with the interpretation of Congress'
constitutional power to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces."' Therefore, it is arguable that, regardless of the presence or
absence of jury trial and grand jury indictment, Congress lacks the power to reg-
ulate the conduct of military personnel if that conduct is not service-connected. Un-
der this view Congress is constitutionally powerless to prohibit the acts that were
involved in the O'Callahan case. Even if there had been legislative provision for
prosecution of such acts in a federal tribunal where jury trial and grand jury in-
dictment were available, jurisdiction of the offense would be lacking because Con-
gress has no authority to regulate conduct that is not service-connected. Of course,
if Congress lacked such authority, it could not be delegated to the President or to
military commanders by Congress; nor would the Commander-in-Chief and his
subordinate commanders appear to possess such authority in their own right.
Furthermore, even if the President issued military orders that all personnel should
refrain from certain conduct, the existence of such orders would not establish that
the conduct was service-connected. Otherwise, the military establishment would be
free to evade O'Callahan by issuing orders which prohibited conduct that in itself
was not service-connected, relying on the orders to establish service-connection of the
prohibited conduct, and prosecuting for disobedience of the prohibitory orders 5 Of
course, if O'Callahan intended only to denounce the lack of jury trial and grand
jury indictment as to conduct that is not service-connected, then an entirely different
result would obtain. Congress could cure the defect by providing that misconduct
of military personnel, if not service-connected, could nonetheless be prosecuted
in a federal district court, where jury trial and grand jury indictment are available,
'Similarly, the President and his subordinate military commanders could be authorized
to issue orders regulating conduct that lacked service-connection, and prosecutions
for disobedience of these orders would also take place in the federal courts.
81395 U.S. at 261, 273.
The Court of Military Appeals has ruled that O'Callahan does not apply to offenses committed
overseas. United States v. Keaton, i9 U.S.C.M.A. 64, 41 C.M.R. 64 (x969). See also Blumenfeld, Court-
Martial Jurisdiction Over Civilian-Type Crimes, io Amt. Caim. L. Rav. 51, 72 (i97i); Everett, O'Callahan
v. Parker-Milestone or Millstone in Military Justice?, 1969 DuKF LJ. 853, 89o.
88 United States v. Sharkey, ig U.S.C.M.A. 26, 41 C.M.R. 26 (1969); Blumenfeld, supra note 82,
at 71; Everett, supra note 82, at 893.
a& US. CONsr. art. 1, § 8, ci. 14.
"The Court of Military Appeals seems to have rejected the view that the giving" of the order provides
service-connection. United States v. Castro, i8 U.S.C.MA. 598, 40 C.M.R. 310 (1969).
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In addition to restricting the jurisdiction of courts-martial, the courts have some-
times opened wider the doors for successful collateral attack on court-martial juris-
diction." The availability of added opportunities for successful collateral attack on
military action also has a limiting practical effect on the discretion available to the
President and his subordinate commanders in the administration of military justice.
II
MILTARY DIscRET N To EMPLOY ALTERNATiVES To
TRIAL By COURT-MARTIAL
A. Assignment of Duties
In civilian life criminal prosecutions are not the only means whereby govern-
mental authorities may seek to deter disapproved conduct. Revocation of a license to
practice a profession, 7 conduct a business, or operate a vehicle,"' as well as de-
portation of undesirable aliens,"9 blacklisting of government contractors,"0 and civil
penalties 1 illustrate, but do not exhaust, the possibilities.
Similarly, military commanders have many alternatives to the use of trial by
court-martial. The very authority to give orders and promulgate regulations-an
authority fortified by severe criminal penalties for disobedience 92-provides the com-
mander with an important disciplinary tool. He may order a subordinate to take, or
not take, some action, and disobedience of the order could then be punished by court-
martial. Of course, if the order is given for the sole purpose of increasing the
penalty for an offense which it is expected the recipient of the order will com-
mit, then disobedience of the order is not punishable. 3 Similarly, a commander
may not order a subordinate to perform additional duties for punitive purposes with-
out complying with the Uniform Code. 4 However, the commander is free to
" See, e.g., Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34 (1972); Kauffman v. Secretary of the Air Force, 415;
F.ad 991 (D.C. Cir. 1969); but see Noyd v. Bond, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969); United States v. Augcnblick,
393 U.S. 348 (I969); Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (x953). The leading precedents are discussed in
Weckstein, Federal Court Review of Courts-Martial Proceedings: A Delicate Balance of Individual Rights
and Military Responsibilities, 54 MIL. L. RaV. 1 (1971); Everett, Collateral Attack on Court.Martlial
Convictions, ii A.F. JAG L. RV. 399 (1969); Sherman, Judicial Review of Military Determinations
and the Exhaustion of Remedies Requirement, 55 VA. L. REv. 483 (1969). The courts have also proved
more receptive to collateral attacks on military administrative action. Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579
(1958); Everett, Military Administrative Discharges-The Pendulum Swings, 1966 Duns L.J. 41, 67.
"'For example, an attorney may be disbarred from practice of his profession. 7 Ai. Jus. 2D
Attorneys at Law § 12-72 (1963).
" Suspension or revocation of a driver's license because of traffic convictions is a familiar part of
motor vehicle codes. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16 (Supp. 1965).
" See 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1970).
" See, for example, 41 U.S.C. §§ io(b), 37, 276a(2) (a) (1970), authorizing the debarment of bidders
who have violated the Davis-Bacon, Walsh-Healy, and Buy American Acts.
" Civil penalties often are authorized without regard to the results of criminal proceedings which
arise from the same facts. Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); United States ex.
rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (938); Various Items v.
United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931).9
2U.C.M.J., arts. 90_92, 10 U.S.C. §§ 890-92 (970); MANUAL, I 127b.
'"MANUAL, 169b.
" U.C.M.J., art. 13, 1o U.S.C. § 813 (19'o).
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require performance of additional duties for training purposes, 95 and misconduct on
the part of a member of his organization may properly alert the commander to that
member's need for additional training. Many onerous duties in the armed forces-
such as kitchen police--have either disappeared or become less prevalent. Other
duties may vanish in the near future as part of the program to make the military
service more attractive to prospective volunteers. Yet the residue of unpleasant
chores still seems sufficient to provide commanders with an important disciplinary
tool.
In combat areas the commander's discretion in assigning hazardous duties is
coupled with frightening penalties for failure to perform the assignments 6 Com-
manders in charge of confinement installations may use administrative segregation
and close order drill to correct inmates. 7 And commanders generally have a broad
administrative power to deny passes and leave to their personnel or to impose re-
strictions to specified areas or limits. s
While it is true that the Code limits the imposition of an order which imposes
additional duties for punitive purposes,99 the order will enjoy the benefit of a
presumption of legality.'0 0 And, unless a commander is very ill-informed, proof
that he intended his order as a punishment will be hard to come by, for he will
usually have some other explanation for giving the order. Moreover, there is con-
siderable judicial reluctance to undertake review of the assignments of military
duties. 10' Thus, an order assigning extra duties or restricting the recipient to
specified limits can be challenged only at considerable peril to the subordinate who,
disobeys the order.
" United States v. Trani, i U.S.C.M.A. 293, 3 C.M.R. 27 (1952).
" See U.C.M.J., art. 9g, io U.S.C. § 899 (1970).
07United States v. Phillips, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 230, 39 C.M.R. 230 (1969); United States v. Vaughan,
3 U.S.C.M.A. 121, 1x C.M.R. x2i (1953); United States v. Trani, i U.S.C.M.A. 293, 3 C.M.R. 27 (1952);
but cf. United States v. Williams, zo U.S.C.M.A. 615, 28 C.M.R. 18 (959); United States v. Bayhand,
6 U.S.C.M.A. 762, 21 C.M.R. 84 (1956).
0
8
Cf. United States v. Petroff-Tachomakoff, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 8o6, ig C.M.R. i2o (x955); United States
v. Teague, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 317, 12 C.M.R. 73 (1953); but cf. United States v. Gentle, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 437,
37 C.M.R. 57 (1966); United States v. Haynes, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 122, 35 C.M.R. 94 (1964). See also
MANUAL, t 128C.
"' Article 13 of the U.C.M.J., Xo US.C. § 813 (1970), prohibits punishment before trial; and Article
15 of the Code, so U.S.C. § 815 (1970), appears to provide the sole method for legally imposing non-
judicial punishment. Cf. United States v. Gentle, x6 U.S.C.M.A. 437, 37 C.M.R. 57 (1966); United States
v. Haynes, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 122, 35 C.M.R. 94 (1964); United States v. Williams, so U.S.C.M.A. 615, 28
C.M.R. 1S (959); United States v. Bayband, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 762, 2r C.M.R. 84 (1956). Moreover,
an order may not be "given for the sole purpose of increasing the penalty for an offense which it is
expected the accused may commit." MANUAL, 169b.
... The Manual now provides that "an order requiring the performance of a military duty or act
may be inferred to be lawful and it is disobeyed at the peril of the subordinate." MANUAL, 169b. The
corresponding wording of the 1951 Manual was that "an order requiring the performance of a military
duty or act is presumed to be lawful and is disobeyed at the peril of the subordinate." MANUAL roR
CouRTsoMARTAL, UNiTED STATES (i95i), t 169b. The full impact of the change from presumption to
inference is not yet clear. Among the cases relying on the presumption of legality under the prior Manual
wording are United States v. Coombs, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 749, 25 C.M.R. 253 (1958), and United States
v. Trani, x U.S.C.M.A. 293, 3 C.M.R. 27 (1952).
'o' See, e.g., Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
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B. Promotions
Pay and assignments have a very direct relationship to rank. Accordingly, by
means of their discretion in determining promotions, military commanders possess
an important tool for controlling the conduct of their personnel. With respect to
enlisted personnel, commanders have a very direct control over promotions. More-
over, under some circumstances administrative demotions for inefficiency may be
ordered. Promotions of officers hinge on the decisions of selection boards, which
consider the military records of the various officers eligible for promotion. However,
the most relevant part of these records for promotion purposes are the various
ratings which, pursuant to service regulations, are periodically given to officers by their
superiors. Low ratings of an officer by his commander may preclude his promo-
tion. Furthermore, having been passed over when eligible for promotion may lead
to an officer's separation from the service. Thus, especially for a career officer, fear of
a low rating from his commander may have a very inhibiting influence on his con-
duct, and a commander is free to exploit that fear for disciplinary purposes. 102
C. Administrative Discharges
Often a commander's primary concern is to remove permanently from his unit-
and perhaps from the armed services-a serviceman who is suspected of serious or
repeated misconduct or who is a sexual deviant or a drug addict. One avenue to this
goal is by preferring criminal charges, referring them to a court-martial for trial,
and seeking a sentence which includes punitive discharge-a bad conduct discharge
if the accused is tried by special court-martial or either a dishonorable or bad conduct
discharge if he is .tried by general court-martial.' 3 If, however, such a discharge is
adjudged, then .the Uniform Code provides for extensive and rather time-consuming
appellate review. Furthermore, the safeguards provided to the accused by the Code
-such as the presence of a military judge and trained defense counsel, rules of ev-
idence, and proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt-may prevent the court-martial's
returning a finding of guilty. However, a commander may have another means
for separating undesirable personnel, since the Uniform Code does not apply directly
to administrative discharges-discharges which do not result from the sentence of a
court-martial. At the present time five kinds of discharge are in use: (I) honorable;
(2) general-which is under honorable conditions but differs from an honorable
02 There have occasionally been indications that low efficiency ratings may be used by superior military
officers to "punish" defense counsel for distateful tactics. See, e.g., United States v. Kitchens, x2
U.S.C.M.A. 589, 592, & n.3, 31 C.M.R. 175, 178, & n.3 (1961). Congress has now specifically pro-
hibited the use of efficiency ratings to influence court-martial personnel. U.C.M.J., art. 37(b), 5o U.S.C.
§ 83 7(b) (1970). Military personnel may seek to attack unfavorable efficiency ratings through the Board
for Correction of Military Records, established in each military department under lo U.S.C. § 1552
(1970).
.. Articles 18 and x9 of the Uniform Code, 1o U.S.C. §§ 8X8, 819 (X97o), deal respectively with
the jurisdiction of general and special courts-martial. Dismissal of an officer, which can only be ad.
judged by a general court-martial, is equivalent to a dishonorable discharge of enlisted personnel.
DiSCRETION IN MILITARY JUsTICE 187
discharge; (3) undesirable; (4) bad conduct; and (5) dishonorable'0  The first
three kinds can only result from administrative action and are not considered to be
punishment; the last two must be adjudged by a court-martial as punishment. Re-
gardless of the theoretical difference between them, the bad conduct discharge and
the undesirable discharge, which is administrative, have almost the same effects on
benefits. Moreover, each carries considerable stigma for the recipient. 5 And the
administrative undesirable discharge may be based on an unfitness demonstrated by
acts for which the perpetrator could be tried by court-martial. 06
Thus, a military commander often finds that.he has discretion to choose between
two methods for achieving separation of a misbehaving serviceman-namely, trial
... See Everett, Military Administrative Discharges-The Pendulum Swings, 1966 DUKE L.J. 41,
43. The Task Force on the Administration of Military Justice believes "that the administrative dis-
charge has impacted to the detriment of minority group servicemen. In all services, black service mem-
bers received in Fiscal Year 1971 a lower proportion of honorable discharges and a higher proportion
of general and undesirable discharges than whites of similar aptitude and education." I TAsK FORCE ON
THE ADMINITRATION OF MILITARY JUsTIcE IN THE ARMED FoRcEs, REPORT 109 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as TAsK FoRcE REPORT]. Accordingly,
half the members of the Task Force recommend that the present characterization of admin-
istrative discharges be eliminated. The other half believe that the honorable discharge should be
retained, although some would accept a course of action that would retain the honorable discharge
but substitute the furnishing of an uncoded certificate of service in all administrative separations
not meriting an honorable discharge. A majority of the members of the Task Force believe that
if the honorable discharge is eliminated, the manner in which that would be accomplished would
require serious and intensive study and that, pending completion of such a study, uncoded cer-
tificates of service should be furnished in all separations not meriting an honorable discharge.
The procedure for processing service personnel for elimination'with other than an honorable
discharge [should] be revised to:
a. Ensure that the prospective dischargee is fully advised as to the potential consequences of
the receipt of a discharge other than an honorable discharge, with an accurate and realistic
appraisal of the possibility that such a discharge would never be changed to a a discharge of a more
creditable nature; and
b. Strengthen the administrative due process safeguards presently accorded in the admin-
istrative discharge system by:
(z) Requiring a legally-qualified officer to sit as a member of any administrative elim-
ination board, ruling on all legal questions.
(2) Requiring that the serviceman consult with counsel at' the outset of any processing
for elimination.
(3) Giving the respondent a right to legal counsel furnished by the government throughout
the proceedings.
(4) Providing for participation by legally-qualified officers in review procedures.
c. Provide to the extent practicable that the composition of administrative elimination boards
be designed to include minority membership.
d. Provide for the conditional suspension of administrative discharges and a probationary
period, including reassignment to a new unit, for persons recommended for an administrative
discharge, requiring the discharge authority, when he does not suspend the discharge and place
the serviceman on probation, to state in writing his reasons therefor.
Id. 1i8-r9.
o5 Id. at 45 n.2i. Because of the stigma, the Task Force also recommended that the Defense Depart-
ment encourage legislation and other appropriate means that would prohibit civilian employers' inquiries
as to the character of a serviceman's or servicewoman's discharge from the service. One means suggested
was that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission declare such an inquiry to be a discriminatory
practice. The Task Force also recommended exploring the feasibility of establishing a procedure of
substituting an uncoded certificate of service after an appropriate period of time for those who have, in
the past, been awarded other than honorable discharges. Id. at xi9.
'"0 Id. at 45.
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by court-martial, which sometimes proves lengthy and laborious, and undesirable
discharge, issued administratively and thus not subject to the Uniform Code and its
procedural safeguards. The methods are not mutually exclusive; and so a commander
may court-martial an accused for his infractions and, if the court-martial does not
adjudge a punitive discharge, apparently may initiate administrative action based on
essentially the same misconduct
0 7
At one point the armed services apparently abused their discretion to choose
between court-martial and administrative discharge. As the Court of Military Appeals
noted in its annual report for i96o:
The unusual increase in the use of the administrative discharge since the code
became a fixture has led to the suspicion that the services were resorting to that
means of circumventing the requirements of the code. The validity of that
suspicion was confirmed by Maj. Gen. Reginald C. Harmon, then Judge Advocate
General of the Air Force, at the annual meeting of the Judge Advocates Association
held at Los Angeles, Calif., August 26, 1958. He there declared that the tre-
mendous increase in undesirable discharges by administrative proceedings was the
result of efforts of military commanders to avoid the requirements of the Uniform
Code. Although he acknowledged that men thereby affected were deprived of
the protection afforded by the code, no action to curtail the practice was initiated.108
As I have discussed elsewhere, this discretion has now been considerably limited
by regulations of the armed services themselves and by various judicial decisions'
Furthermore, Senator Ervin, the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Con-
stitutional Rights, has for many years made legislative proposals to regulate more
closely the issuance of administrative discharges." 0 However, a considerable residue
of discretion still remains with the commander to choose between court-martial, ad-
nnistrative discharge proceedings, or a combination of the two.
D. Nonjudicial Punishment
Up to this point the discussion has concerned a commander's discretion to take
action which, although not labelled punitive, may have much the same effect as
would punishment. However, a commander also has the discretion to initiate action
which is designated punishment but does not utilize trial by court-martial. Under
Article 15 of the Uniform Code and subject to any more restrictive departmental
2
07 Id. at 78-8o. A court-martial has a different burden of proof for the Government-namely,
proof beyond reasonable doubt. However, it is arguable that failure of a court-martial to impose a punitive
discharge should limit the authority of the Government to discharge administratively for what is basically
the same misconduct.
10. Quoted in x962 Hearings 2.
"09 In Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958), the Supreme Court ruled that administrative dis-
charges were judicially reviewable. Since then various cases have arisen which involved attacks on ad-
ministrative discharge action. See Everett, supra note 104. Among the most fruitful grounds of attack
has been failure by the armed services to follow their own regulations. See, e.g., Roberts v. Vance, 343
F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Murray v. United States, 554 Ct. Cl. x85 (r961); Clackum v. United States,
296 F.2d 226 (Ct. Cl. 596o). Cf. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
... See Everett, supra note 104, at 41.
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regulations, "any commanding officer" may impose certain nonjudicial punish-
ment."'' The maximum punishment imposable is to some extent related to the
rank of the commander who imposes the punishment. For example, if it is im-
posed on an enlisted accused by an officer of the grade of at least major or
lieutenant commander, then nonjudicial punishment may include up to thirty
consecutive days of "correctional custody";"" but otherwise it is limited to seven
consecutive days.
An Air Force squadron commander or Army company commander would nor-
mally lack power to convene a court-martial of any type; thus, if he chooses not to
utilize Article 15, or if the accused refuses to accept nonjudicial punishment, the unit
commander must either drop the charges or refer them to a superior commander for
consideration. The captain of a naval vessel not only may impose nonjudicial punish-
ment but also is empowered to convene a summary or special court-martial to try
the accused. The traditionally wide discretion belonging to the captain of a naval
vessel is also reaffirmed in Article i5's provision that as to enlisted persons "attached
to or embarked in a vessel," a commander may impose "confinement on bread and
water or diminished rations for not more than three consecutive days.""'  Ironically,
even a general court-martial is subject to this same limitation in adjudging the pun-
ishment of confinement on bread and water, which in the view of the Court of
Military Appeals involves cruel and unusual punishment."4
Not only the rank of the commander imposing nonjudicial punishment but also
1 .11U.C.M.J., art. x5, io U.S.C. § 8z5 (X970). See also United States v. Mackie, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 14
36 C.M.R. x7O (x966), which analogized Article 15 to the procedures available under i8 U.S.C. §§ 1(3),
3401 (197o). The Task Force made a number of recommendations concerning nonjudicial punishment
under Article i5-among them the following: nonjudicial punishment procedures be standardized among
the services, insofar as practicable; servicemen be given the right to obtain the advice of legally-qualified
military counsel before deciding whether to demand trial in lieu of nonjudicial punishment. (except in
those situations when the exigencies of the service limit the availability of counsel); an individual receive
a personal hearing before the commander contemplating the imposition of punishment (except, again,
when prevented by the exigencies of the service); a person at an Article 15 hearing have the right to
be accompanied by an available personal representative-who may but need not be a lawyer-to advise
him and to make a statement on his behalf; all Article 15 hearings be open to spectators, except
where security interests dictate otherwise, but that the individual have the right to confer privately
with the commander imposing punishment, to relate matters of a personal nature; when there
are controverted questions of fact, witnesses be called if present on the same ship, post, or other-
wise available; forfeitures and reduction not be imposed at a single Article 15 action since both carry
a loss of income; commanders take into consideration the effect which any monetary loss will have
upon the offender or his family; commanders who impose a reduction in grade upon a fifrst offender as
a part of nonjudicial punishment, and who do not suspend that reduction, state for the record their
reasons for not doing so; the increased use of correctional custody as a form of nonjudicial punishment
be encouraged, with the necessary funding for manpower .and facilities being provided; punishment
under Article 15 be stayed upon the filing of an appeal, provided the appeal is made it the time of
imposition of punishment or within a reasonable time thereafter; every person receiving nonjudicial
punishment be properly advised of his right to appeal; the length of time an Article 15 conviction
remains in an individual's field personnel file be standardized; periodic monitoring of the administration
of nonjudicial punishment be provided. TAs FoRCE REPoar 120-231. In January, 1973, many of these
recommendations were administratively implemented by Secretary of Defense Laird.
"' "Correctional custody" is defined in MAxuAL, 131c(4).
"5 U.C.M.J., art. i5(b)(2)(A), io U.S.C. § 8s5(b) (2) (A) (1970).
... United States v. Wappler, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 393, 9 C.M.R. 23 (X953).
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the rank or grade of the accused affects the maximum punishment imposable. An
officer is subject to entirely different nonjudicial punishments than those which a
commander may impose on enlisted personnel." 5 Further, an enlisted member in a
pay grade above E-4 may not be reduced more than two pay grades."'
Although Article 15 provides for appeal from nonjudicial punishments, the
greatest restraint on use of nonjudicial punishment is the option of an accused
who has been offered such punishment to demand trial by court-martial." Until
recently the case of an accused who rejected nonjudicial punishment might be
referred to a summary court-martial for trial-where procedural protections are, at
best, minimal-and he would have no right to refuse such trial. The Military
Justice Act of 1968 created an absolute right to refuse trial by summary court-
martial-even if the accused had initially been offered nonjudicial punishment'
1 8
Accordingly, in exercising his discretion in the first instance either to deal with an
offense nonjudicially under Article 15 or to prefer charges for trial by court-martial,
a commander must consider the possibility that, even if initiated under Article 15,
the case may, by the accused's exercise of his statutory rights, ultimately reach a
special or general court-martial.
At one time it seemed arguable that if a case were initiated under Article 15
or by reference of charges to a summary court-martial but later was transferred to a
special or general court-martial as a result of the accused's election not to receive
nonjudicial punishment or not to be tried by summary court-martial, then the pun-
ishment imposable by the special or general court-martial should be limited to that
which initially would have been imposable nonjudicially or by summary court-
115U.C.M.J., art. i5 (b)(i), Io U.S.C. § 8&s(b)(i) (1970), as to officers; U.C.MJ., art. i5(b)(2),
ro U.S.C. § 855(b)(2) (1970), as to other personnel. An officer may not be subjected to correctional
custody or confinenent, demoted in grade, or assigned extra duties as nonjudicial punishment; under
some circumstances such punishments may be imposed on enlisted personnel pursuant to Article z5.
... U.C.M.J., art. i5(b) (2) (H) (iv), Xo U.S.C. & 815(b) (2) (H) (iv) (1970). The power to demote
depends on the promotion authority of the commander who is imposing nonjudicial punishment. See also
U.C.M.J., art. 15 (b)(2)(D) (1970).
"' "[E]xcept in the case of a member attached to or embarked in a vessel, nonjudicial punishment
may not be imposed upon any member of the armed forces if he has, before the imposition of such
punishment, demanded trial by court-martial in lieu of such punishment." U.C.M.J., art. x5(a), io U.S.C.
§ 8Is(a) (1970). As originally enacted, the Uniform Code did not grant a right to demand trial by
court-martial in lieu of nonjudicial punishment, although it did grant the secretary of a department
power, by regulation, to place limitations on the applicability of nonjudicial punishment to an accused
who demands trial by court-martial. Pursuant to this provision, the Army and the Air Force granted an
absolute right to demand trial by court-martial in lieu of nonjudicial punishment. The Navy and the
Coast Guard gave no such right. MANuA. FoR CouRvs-MAR-nAL, Uss'mn STArEs (195X), 132. In x962,
when the powers of a commander under Article 15 were strengthened, Congress also gave a statutory
basis for the right to demand trial by court-martial except for personnel "attached to or embarked in
a vessel." The current Manual follows the statutory wording. MANUAL, 132.
118 U.C.M.J., art. 2o, io U.S.C. § 82o (1970). Previously an accused could object to trial by sum-
mary court-martial unless "he has been permitted and has elected to refuse punishment under Article
15." MANUAL FOR CoUsRS-MARTI'AL, UNTra STATES (1951), 79d(). Undoubtedly the right to object
to nonjudicial punishment was significantly less valuable when the likelihood remained that the case
could be referred to a summary court-martial and that the accused could not object to trial by that
court-martial. This problem never existed for officers and warrant officers who have not been subject
to trial by summary court-martial under the Uniform Code. U.C.M.J., art. 2o, 1o U.S.C. § 820 (1970).
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martial. However, the recent Supreme Court ruling which upheld increased
sentences after a de novo trial upon appeal from an inferior court would suggest a
different result." 9 Accordingly, an accused who declines nonjudicial punishment
under Article 15 or elects not to be tried by a summary court-martial must reckon with
the possibility that, when tried by a special or general court-martial, which has
greater authority to punish, he may receive a sentence far greater than the maximum
imposable either nonjudicially or by summary court-martial. Furthermore, in the
instance of nonjudicial punishment, he does not carry the stigma of court conviction
that would result from being found guilty by any kind of court-martial.12
E. Trial by Civil Court
Frequently a serviceman's conduct may involve not only violation of the Uni-
form Code but also of federal or state statutes or, if occurring overseas, the laws of
a foreign country. In that instance, a military commander may have discretion
to determine whether the accused is tried by a civil court, by a court-martial, or
under some circumstances, by both. Within the United States, if military authorities
institute court-martial proceedings, they are entitled to proceed and have no obliga-
tion to delay in order to permit trial in the civil courts.' 2 Conversely, if the juris-
diction of a state or federal civil court first attaches, it cannot be ousted by the com-
mencement of court-martial proceedings. Trial by court-martial will preclude trial
in a federal district court for the same offense, and vice versa.' 2 Whether a court-
martial creates double jeopardy with respect to trial in a state court, or the converse,
seems more doubtfulV2m
Although American military authorities seem free under the Constitution to
waive their jurisdiction over a serviceman in order to permit his trial by a foreign
country,124 American policy does not favor such waivers. 25 The NATO Status of
"0 Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
0 Contrary to the provisions under the 1951 Manual, nonjudicial punishments may be considered
by a court-martial in determining an appropriate sentence. MANuAL, 75d. United States v. Johnson,
i9 U.S.C.M.A. 464, 42 C.M.R. 66 (1970). However, it remains true that an "Article I5 punishment is
not a conviction; it does not empower a court-martial to adjudge permissible additional punishments
under Section B of the Table of Maximum Punishments." Id. at 467, 42 C.M.R. at 69.
.21 Concerning the relationship between courts-martial and civil courts, see . EvERETT, supra
note 42, at 38-40.
12u Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907).
12Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (x959); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); United
States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922); but cf. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n., 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
Regardless of constitutional limitations, trial by court-martial for a crime for which the serviceman
has already been tried in a state court is infrequent. z962 Hearings 848, 874, 909, 945, 961.
124 Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (957).
12. Cf. J. SNEE & A. BYE, STATus OF FORCES AGREEMENT: CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 117-19 (1957);
R. EvERTrr, supra note 42, at 44-45. With respect to the Status of Forces Agreement, the Task Force
recommended that when a case involves the exercise of jurisdiction by a foreign government a military
advisor be provided to the accused, necessary action be taken to pay the accused who is in pretrial
confinement, and all services be encouraged to use to the extent practicable a form of restraint other
than pretrial confinement. TAsK FoRcE RPOORT 126-27.
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Forces Agreement 8 and other jurisdictional agreements modelled thereon
127 pre-
scribe very detailed rules concerning primary and secondary jurisdiction where the
misconduct of a serviceman violates both the Uniform Code and the laws of the
host country. 2" Thus, they limit the military commander's discretion to choose
between trial by court-martial and trial in the civil courts. Also, the Status of Forces
Agreement provides a double jeopardy protection that seems unavailable to an
accused who is tried both by court-martial and by state court.129
In determining whether to try by court-martial or to defer to trial in the civil
courts, military commanders may be limited by agreements between the Defense
Department and the Department of Justice80 and by local understandings with civil
authorities. They may also be influenced by the circumstance that a serviceman who
is convicted of a felony by a civil court may be administratively discharged as un-
desirable.' 3 ' Thus, trial and conviction of a serviceman in a civil court may provide
an easy means for separating him from the armed services.
F. Reserve Personnel
If reserve personnel on extended active duty engage in conduct distasteful to
their commanders, the result may be release from active duty.'32 This discretion
to release from active duty may have serious financial consequences for the reservist-
especially for the career reserve officer. Thus, a reservist may have a strong induce-
ment to behave in the manner least likely to prompt a decision by his commander
that he be returned to civilian life.
For reserve personnel not on active duty, the discretion of military commanders
may be adversely exercised in just the opposite way-by action that will bring such
personnel from civilian life into uniform. Sometimes a poorly performing reservist
has been ordered to extended active duty pursuant to his obligations as a member
of the reserve'forces; in other instances, he has been dropped from his reserve
"'NATO Status of Forces Agreement, June 'g, '95', art. VIII, [9.53] 2 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No.
2846. See also Status of Forces Policies and lnformation, Department of Defense Directive No. 5525.1,
Jan. 2o, x966.
""5 For example, an executive agreement of Oct. 29, 1953, with Japan, contained criminal juris-
dictional provisions like those of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. See [1953] 4 U.S.T. 1846,
T.IA.S. No. 2848. The agreement with West Germany modifies the jurisdictional scheme significantly.
Supplementary Agreement to NATO Status of Forces Agreement for Federal Republic of Germany,
Aug. 3, 1959, [1963] 14 U.S.T. 531, T.IA.S. No. 535 X (effective July z, x963).
... Generally the host country will have primary jurisdiction unless the offense was committed in the
performance of official duty or involved only the security or property of the sending state or the
person or property of other nationals of the sending state. NATO Status of Forces Agreement, art.
VII, 3.
120 NATO Status of Forces Agreement, art. VII, 8. For cases involving this protection see United
States v. Cadenhead, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 271, 34 C.M.R. 51 (x963); United States v. Sinigar, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 330,
.2o CJ.R 46 (i955).
ISO r962 Hearings 847, 909, 945.
281 See Everett, supra note X04, at 58.
'" See, for example Roberts v. Vance, 343 F-ad 236 (D.C. Cir. 1964), where, however, the release
efrom active duty of the reserve Army officer was set aside because the Army failed to abide by applicable
Army regulations governing such releases.
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unit and thereby made subject to draft induction. Thus, one reservist was in danger
of induction because he had not received credit for attending the training periods
of his reserve unit. Under Army directives, credit was precluded since the reservist
had appeared at such periods in long hair, which he claimed was necessitated by
his employment as agent for "rock and roll" bands. Upholding -the military estab-
lishment, a Court of Appeals observed that applicable statutes required reserve per-
sonnel to "satisfactorily participate in scheduled drills and training periods as pre-
scribed by the Secretary of Defense"; and it concluded that, unless extraordinary
circumstances existed, courts should not review a military determination that
participation had been unsatisfactory."' Existence of this administrative means
to discipline reserve personnel not on active duty is all the more important because
of severe limitations on military jurisdiction to try such personnel by court-martial' 3 4
III
INVESTIGATION AND PRETRIAL PROCEDURES
A. Searches and Seizures
Although the Uniform Code does not purport to limit unreasonable searches
and seizures, the Manual for Courts-Martial has long contained a prohibition against
the reception of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure.135 How-
ever, the determination of what constitutes reasonableness still leaves considerable
room for a commander's discretion to operate. At one time it was the position of
the military establishment that searches on a military installation could be under-
taken by authorization of a suitable commander without any showing of probable
cause. The commander was analogized to a property-owner inspecting his own
property. The Court of Military Appeals did not accept this view and has long
required that probable cause exist even for a search on post. 38 However, the military
commander remains free to determine probable cause, rather than submit the facts
to a neutral, detached magistrate'3 Nor has there been a requirement that an
affidavit be prepared which would set forth the circumstances believed to establish
probable cause.'38
l"Raderman v. Kaine, 411 F.2d 1102 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 976 (1969).
"' See U.C.M.J., Article 2(3), zo U.S.C. § 802(3) (1970), which restricts such jurisdiction to those
reservists who have voluntarily accepted written orders specifying that they are subject to the Uniform
Code of Military justice. See also United States v. Schuering, i6 U.S.C.M.A. 324, 36 C.M.R. 480 (1966);
but see Wallace v. Chafee, 451 F.2d 1374 (gth Cir. 197).
... MANUAL, i 152. See also MANuAL FoR Cou=rs-MAam'AL, UNanT. STATES (1951), 152.
... United States v. Brown, io U.S.C.M.A. 482, 28 C.M.R. 48 (1959).
... As to the requirement of a neutral, detached magistrate, see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (197); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 1o8 (1964); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (i958).
"" For applications of this requirement in the federal courts, see, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 394
U.S. 410 (1969); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965). In United States v. Martinez, x6
U.S.C.M.A. 40, 36 C.vf.R. 196 (1966), it is suggested that authority to search be in writing and set out
the facts upon which the authorization is based and the articles to be seized. See also United States
v. Penman, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 67, 69, 36 C.M.R. 223, 225 (1966). The Air Force seems to have accepted
this suggestion. See AF Form x76 "Authority to Search and Seize."
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The Manual for Courts-Martial appears to allow "administrative inspections.
189
In so doing, it has given greater legitimacy to the shakedown inspections so often
u:ed in the armed forces-inspections of a barracks or similar area to determine its
cleanliness and the presence of contraband. 4 These inspections provide an obvious
tool for harassment, and they are hard to reconcile with the Supreme Court's em-
phasis on the need for court orders even in connection with health inspections.' 4 '
However, recently the Court has granted greater leeway for administrative inspec-
tions without court orders.'42
The armed services have themselves begun to encourage the preparation of writ-
ten statements of reasons for a search 4 3--statements somewhat paralleling the
affidavits used in civil courts for establishing probable cause. Also, the military
judge is sometimes being utilized as a magistrate to determine whether probable cause
exists.14 Just as warrants issued by a magistrate upon an affidavit are given greater
weight than the determination of probable cause by a police officer, so too, the war-
rants for search issued by the military judges will probably fare better in the courts
than determinations of probable cause made by a commander. It seems likely that
control of authorizations to search will ultimately be concentrated in the hands of the
military judiciary, in which event the courts may be more willing to decide border-
line cases in favor of the Government.
B. Apprehension and Confinement
Apprehension-the military equivalent of arrest in civilian life14--requires
"reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the person appre-
hended committed it."'146 However, the Code does not provide either for the issuanco
of arrest warrants or for preliminary hearings to determine if probable cause exists.
Thus, the discretion of military authorities in taking a serviceman into custody as
a suspect is virtually non-reviewablej
47
... See MANUAL, 152. After setting forth a restriction on permissible objects of search, the Manual
provides that, "[t]his restriction does not apply to administrative inspections or inventories conducted
in accordance with law, regulation, or custom." In the corresponding paragraph of the x951 Manual
there is no reference to "administrative inspections," but an exception is recognized for the legality of
searches made by military personnel "in accordance with military custom." MANUAL tor COUnrs-MARTIL,
UNrED STATES (1951), t 1.52.
"0 'The Court of Military Appeals has been willing to uphold "shakedown" inspections under
some circumstances. United States v. Gebhart, so U.SC.M.A. 6W6, 28 C.M.R. 172 (1959); United States
v. Swanson, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 671, 14 C.M.R. 89 (1954). For a recent case holding that, under the par-
ticular facts, the shakedown was a search and not an inspection, see United States v. Lazerus, C.M.
426877 (Army Court of Military Review, Aug. 15, 1972).
141 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
"' Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
... See note 138, supra.
.. The Army has empowered its military judges to issue search warrants. See 1971 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 3, at 3, 2r.
"4 In military justice, "arrest is the restraint of a person by an order, not imposed as punishment
for an offense, directing him to remain within certain specified limits." MANUAL, j I8a.
14 0 U.C.M.J., art. 7, 10 U.S.C. § 807 (970).
"47 If a search has been made incident to apprehension, the legality of the apprehension may be
reviewed in determining the admissibility of evidence seized in connection therewith. See, e.g., United
States v. Ball, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 25, 23 C.M.R. 249 (1957).
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Pretrial confinement of persons charged with offenses is authorized by the
Uniform Code "as circumstances may require.""" The Manual for Courts-Martial
limits this authority to situations where such confinement is "deemed necessary to
insure the presence of the accused at the trial or because of the seriousness of the
offense charged." '149 The military's right to confine before trial because of the
seriousness of the offense charged may go beyond the power of civil authorities. 50
Moreover, in civilian life bail is available so that an accused may obtain his release
prior to trial, and an unreasonably high bail may be contested by-appeal. 5 ' In the
military system of justice bail is not allowed, and judicial remedies are not readily
available to contest an unreasonable denial of freedom pending trial 52 In some
military commands, however, local regulations have been promulgated to prevent un-
necessary pretrial confinement. 58  Moreover, in civilian life there has been con-
siderable criticism of reliance on bail as a means of assuring the accused's presence at
trial' 54 Thus, the unavailability of bail in the military establishment may be less sig-
nificant than might first appear. Furthermore, military justice insists on a speedy
trial so that pretrial confinement may prove much shorter for a military accused than
for his civilian counterpart who fails to make bail' 55 Even so, military commanders
have a degree of discretion as to pretrial confinement unrivaled in civilian life.
C. Statements and Reports
Often military authorities will be in an advantageous position to obtain admis-
sions from a suspect. For one thing, the suspect will frequently be young, in-
148 U.C.M.J., art. io, Io U.S.C. § 81o (1970).
SMANUAL, 20C. The Task Force has recommended that
[p]rocedures concerning the admission of an accused into pretrial confinement and retention
therein in each service be standardized with a view towards limiting the opportunity for the abuse
of discretion and enhancing the perception of fairness, such procedures to include the appointment
of both a qualified judge advocate defense counsel to talk with each accused prior to his entry
into pretrial confinement or shortly thereafter, and a legal officer, independent of the confining
command, authorized to review the pretrial confinement and release the accused from confinement
as the circumstances warrant; the confinee be served with a copy of any letter requesting or
granting permission for pretrial confinement in excess of thirty days; persons placed in pretrial
confinement for less serious offenses be segregated from those placed in pretrial confinement for
more serious offenses; and the accused, if found guilty, be credited for time spent in pretrial con-
finement.
TASK FoRcE REPORT 122.
... Cf. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. I (I95I), where assuring the defendent's presence seems to be the
sole permissible purpose of bail.
15 1 Id.
..2 See Levy v. Resor, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 135, 37 C.M.R. 399 (1967).
"'5 See z962 Hearings 847, 873, 909, 925, 944, 961. Pretrial confinement contrary to local reg-
ulations is illegal. United States v. Gray, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 615, 20 C.M.R. 331 (1956). The Army has
authorized certain "military magistrates" to release persons in pretrial confinement. See 1971 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 3, at 321.
I" See, e.g., D. FREE & P. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES (1964); Rankin, The Efect of Pre-
trial Detention, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 641 (1964); Foote, The Coming Constitutional Cris in Bail, 113
U. PA. L. REv. 96o, 1125 (1965). Criticism of bail as the determinant of pretrial confinement gave rise
to the Bail Reform Act of 1966, 8o Stat. 214, codified in 8 U.S.C. §§ 3146-5o (1970).
.See, e.g., U.C.M.J., arts. 10, 33, 98, io U.S.C. §§ 8xo, 833, 898 (1970); MANsuAL, %68i, 215e;
United States v. Williams, z6 U.S.C.M.A. 589, 37 C.M.R. 209 (1967).
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experienced, and far away from family and friends; and so he may feel especially
isolated and powerless. He may be more subject to pretrial confinement than a
suspect would in civilian life. He has been conditioned during his military service
to obey an order from his superiors, and a request for a statement regarding an
offense may be interpreted 'by the military suspect as an order to talk. The total
effect of these factors may be a strong pressure on a suspect to make admissions.
Probably to counteract this pressure, Congress has enacted in Article 31 of the
Code a specific requirement that any suspect requested to make a statement must
be informed both of the nature of the offense, and that any statement he does make
may be used in evidence against him.15 This requirement, which preceded the
warning requirement of Miranda and which was relied on in that case in Chief
Justice Warren's opinion,'7 does not depend on custodial interrogation. Thus, in
one way the discretion of military authorities in obtaining statements is limited by
this broad statutory requirement.
Grants of immunity are often a valuable tool for investigators in obtaining state-
ments. Although the Uniform Code does not deal with this subject, the Manual
for Courts-Martial provides that "an authority competent to order a person's trial
by general court-martial may grant or promise him immunity from trial."'58 Thus,
grants of immunity are within the discretion of military commanders without
judicial review.
Various types of reporting requirements are found in civilian life-such as reports
of accidents and reports of certain business transactions. 50 In some manner the duty
to report usually derives from a statute. The military commander may also impose
requirements on his personnel to report certain events or transactions, but in this
instance the requirement stems from military regulation, rather than from statuteY
D. Article 32 Investigation and Staff Judge Advocate's Advice
For charges that may be referred to a general court-martial, Article 3; of the
Uniform Code requires that a 'thorough and impartial investigation be madeY
Provision is made for appointment of an investigator who must inquire into the
form and truth of the charges and make a recommendation "as to -the disposition
art. 3, 10 U.S.C. §- 831 (1970).
"" See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 498 (1966).
... MANtAL, 68h; United States. v. Kirsch, x5 U.S.C.M.A. 84,. 35 C.M.R. 56 (1964). Apparently
'the immunity authorized is a transactional immunity and not merely the immunity from use of testimony
provided under i8 U.S.C. § 6oo2 (1970). See also Kastigar v. United States, 408 U.S. 931 (972). The
convening authority and his staff judge advocate are disqualified from reviewing and taking action as
to .a -record of trial in which a government witness has testified under an immunity grant. See United
States v. Diaz, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 52, 46 C.M.R. 52 (1972).
... See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 425 (i97i); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968);
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948), with respect
to constitutional limitations on reporting requirements.
..0 Prosecutions for failure to comply with the reporting requirements of military regulations were
involved in United Stataes v. Kauffman, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 283, 34 C.M.R. 63 (x963); United States v.
Smith, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 240, 26 C.MIR. 2o (i_.58). See also Kauffman v. Secretary of the Air Force,
415 R.d 991 "(D.C. Cir. x969).
1 1U.C.M.J., art. 32, xo U.S.C. § 832 (1970).
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which should be made of the case in the interest of justice and discipline."' 62 Thus,
the discretion of a military commander is limited by the requirement of this Article
3z investigation, which has sometimes been compared to an inquiry by a civilian
grand jury. However, while the return of an indictment is a prerequisite to further
proceedings in the federal courts and in those state courts which employ a grand
jury, trial by court-martial in the military system can be ordered in the discretion
of a military commander regardless of a contrary recommendation by the officer who
conducted the pretrial investigation. 63
As a prerequisite to trial by general court-martial, the convening authority-the
commander who convenes the court-martial-must obtain advice from his staff judge
advocate or legal officer.' 64 This legal advice must state whether there has been
adequate pretrial investigation, whether each charge alleges an offense, and whether
the allegations are supported by the evidence in the pretrial investigation.'65 How-
ever, the discretion of the convening authority is not limited by the staff judge
advocate's advice; he may still refer for trial any charge that he finds alleges a
violation of the Uniform Code and is warranted by evidence indicated in the Article
32 pretrial investigation. 66
E. Referring Charges for Trial
Charges under the Uniform Code may be signed by any member of the armed
forces who swears that he has investigated or has personal knowledge of the matters
alleged and that they are true to the best of his knowledge and belief. 67 However,
preferring charges is not especially significant in itself, since military commanders
are not required to refer them to a court-martial for trial."' A military commander
202 Id.
... The statute speaks only of a "recommendation" by the investigating officer. See U.C.M.J., art.
32(a), so U.S.C. § 832(a) (597o). See also MANUAL, 34e. If a charge is referred to a general court-
martial for trial, the convening authority must find "that the charge alleges an offense under this chap-
ter and is warranted by evidence indicated in the report of investigation." U.CI.J., art. 3 4 (b), 1o
U.S.C. § 834(b) (970).
.0 U.C.M.J., art. 34(a), 10 U.S.C. § 834(a) (I97O).
... MANUAL, 35c. The staff judge advocate also provides "a signed recommendation of the action
to be taken by the convening authority" and this "recommendation will accompany the charges if they
are referred for trial." Id.
U.C.MJ., art. 34, 1o U.S.C. § 834 (970).
.. U.C.M.J., art. 30, 10 U.S.C. § 830 (1970). However, a" "person subject to the code cannot be
ordered to prefer charges to which he is unable truthfully to make the required oath on his own
responsibility." MANUAL, 29e.
.0 The statutory obligation is that "[u]pon the preferring of charges, the proper authority shall
take immediate steps to determine what disposition should be made thereof in the interest of justice and
discipline, and the person accused shall be informed of the charges against him as soon as practicable."
U.C.M.J., art. 30, 10 U.S.C. § 830 (1970). The Manual requires a "preliminary inquiry into the
charges"; but this inquiry can be informal. MANUAL, 32b. On the basis of this preliminary inquiry,
the accused's immediate military commander may determine to dismiss the charges that have been pre-
ferred, unless he is directed to the contrary by competent superior iuthority. Id., 3 2d. If the com-
mander dismisses all the charges, he may-but apparently is not required to--"notify the accuser of the
action taken and the reasons therefor." Id., 32d. Even for serious charges, there is no requirement
that a formal investigation be conducted under Article 32 as a prerequisite for dismissal.
The convening authority's discretion to determine whether to refer charges for trial and, if so, to
what grade of court-martial is a personal discretion and cannot be delegated. United States v. Simpson,
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has full discretion to refuse to prosecute, subject to being overruled by a military
superior and ordered to take action on the charges. There is, however, no military
grand jury that can indict against his wishes.' Nor is it likely that a military
commander could be himself prosecuted successfully for dereliction of duties by
reason of his failure to refer charges for trial.1
70
There are three types of court-martial: (a) the general court-martial, which may
impose any punishment authorized by the Code and the Manual for Courts-
Martial; 171 (b) the special court-martial, which may adjudge no punishment greater
than a bad conduct discharge, confinement for up to six months, and forfeiture of
up to two-thirds pay for up to six months; 172 and (c) the summary court-martial,
which may not adjudge punishment greater than confinement for one month and
forfeiture of two-thirds pay for one monthj7' Basically the authority to convene a
particular type of court-martial and refer cases to it for trial depends on the position
of a commander in the military hierarchy of command. Thus, a general court-
martial may -be convened by the President, .the secretary of the military department
concerned, or the commander of a division, a fleet, a naval station, an Air Force or
Marine Corps wing." A special court-martial may 'be convened by any person who
may convene a general court-martial and various commanders at lower echelons,
such as the commanders of an Air Force base or an Army or Marine Corps brigade
or regiment and the captain of a naval or Coast Guard vessel. 75 A summary court-
martial may be convened by any person who may convene a general or special court-
martial, the commanding officer of a detached company or other detachment of the
Army, and the commanding officer of a detached squadron or other detachment of
the Air Force.'76 With respect to all three types of courts-martial, Congress granted
the secretary of a military department the power to designate other commanding
.officers who might act as convening authorities; 77 and the same power was given
the President as to general courts-martia'
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i6 U.S.C.M.A. 137, 36 C.M.R. 293 (x966); United States v. Robert, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 322, 22 C.M.R. 112
(1956); United States v. Bunting, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 83, 15 C.M.R. 84 (1954).
S1o United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5 th Cir. 1965), seems to hold that a federal grand jury
cannot return a valid indictment without the cooperation of the United States attorney, who must sign
an indictment before it may become a basis for prosecution.
... A military commander has certain duties with respect to the maintenance of discipline among his
troops. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). Thus, if a commander repeatedly dismissed charges
that had been preferred against members of his command and that clearly had merit, he might be
subject to prosecution under U.C.M.J., Article 92, io U.S.C. § 892 (1970), for dereliction of duties as a
commander. However, a factual situation that would permit successful prosecution on this basis is un-
Itkely. The repeated dismissal of charges would probably not constitute a violation of Article 98, which
proscribes noncompliance with procedural rules. U.C.M.J., art. 98, 1o U.S.C. § 898 (970).
...O.C.1.J., art. x8, io U.S.C. § 8x8 (197o).
U.C.M.J., art. x9, io U.S.C. § 819 (1970).
U.C.M.J., art. 20, 5o U.S.C. § 820 (1970).
' U.C.M.J., art. 22, 10 U.S.C. § 822 (1970).
U.C.M.J., art. 23, 1o U.S.C. § 823 (I97o).
510 U.C.M.J., art. 24, 10 U.S.C. § 824 (1970).
1"U.C.M.J., arts. 22(a)(6), 23(a)(7), 24(a)(4), 1o U.S.C. §§ 822(a)(6), 823(a)(7), 824(a)(4)
(1970).
.. U.C.MJ., art. 22(a)(7), io U.S.C. § 822(a)(7) (970).
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If a commander is not authorized to convene a court-martial which would have
jurisdiction to adjudge the punishment which, in his opinion, is suitable for the
offense charged, he may transmit the charges to a commander of higher rank for
determination of the action to be taken. For example, a company commander in the
Army would usually not have authority to convene any type of court-martial; his
only method for imposing punishment would be by means of nonjudicial punish-
ment under Article 15 of the Uniform Code. Therefore, if the company commander
did not feel that the case was suitable for disposition under Article 15 but that further
action should be taken, he could transmit the charges to the Army regimental or
brigade commander, who would have power to convene either a summary or special
court-martial. If that commander felt that the charges might warrant trial by general
court-martial, he could take steps to transmit the case to the division commander or
some other higher commander with authority to convene a general court-martial.
In the Air Force, the progression might be from the squadron commander to a
group or base commander, and then to the commander of a separate wing or of
some other higher command. In the Navy, fewer steps would be involved, for the
captain of a vessel would have the authority either to mete out nonjudicial punish-
ment or to convene a summary or a special court-martial.
The broad discretion conferred upon military commanders with respect to
referring charges for trial by court-martial is limited in two important ways. Neither
a general nor a special court-martial may be convened by a commanding officer who
is an "accuser"' 7 -- a term which has been broadly defined by the Code s and by
the Court of Military Appeals. For example, a general whose home had been
burglarized could not convene a court-martial to try the accused;' si and in one
case it was held that a general who attempted to convene a court-martial for dis-
obedience of an order issued in his name was disqualified by his personal interest
in the result.' 2
Even an accuser can convene a summary court-martial. Thus, the second lim-
itation on the commander's discretion is especially important. Article 2o provides
an absolute right to object to trial by summary court-martial' 8 3 However, this right
itself contains some peril since the accused who objects to trial by summary court-
martial, which is limited in jurisdiction to the imposition of no more than one
month's confinement, may thereby risk trial by general or special court-martial,
which may adjudge a more serious punishment' s4
'79 U.C.M.J., arts. 22(b), 23(b), 10 U.S.C. §§ 822(b), 823 (b) (1970).
...Article i(9) of the U.C.M.J., so U.S.C. § 8oI(9) (1970), defines accuser as "a person who signs
and swears to charges, any person who directs that charges nominally be signed and sworn to by another,
and any other person who has an interest other than an official interest in the prosecution of the
accused."
1"1 United States v. Gordon, z U.S.C.M.A. 255, 2 C.M.R. 161 (1952).
182United States v. Marsh, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 48, 1I C.M.R. 48 (1953); but c. United States v. Ted,
4 U.S.C.M.A. 39, 15 C.M.R. 39 (1954); United States v. Keith, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 579, 13 C.M.R. 135 (1953).
' Prior to the effective date of the Military Justice Act of 1968 an accused could object to trial by
summary court-martial only if he had not been offered nonjudicial punishment pursuant to Article 15.
... At one time it seemed arguable that the determination of military authorities to refer the charges
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APPOINTMENT OF COURT-MARTIAL PERSONNEL
Considerable invective has been directed against military justice because of the
opportunities for a military commander as convening authority of a court-martial
to "influence the outcome of a case tried by that court. While these opportunities
were significantly curtailed by the Military Justice Act of 1968, they have not
completely been eliminated.
A. General Courts-Martial
Prior to the effective date of the 1968 legislation, only one type of general court-
martial existed, and it was composed of a "law officer" and not less than five mem-
bers.185 In the Army and later in the Navy and Marine Corps, the law officers were
members of a trial judiciary which performed only duties in connection with
general courts-martial and which was considerably insulated from the influence of
military commandersYs In the Air Force full-time law officers were not utilized
and the military lawyers who acted as law officers were much less protected from the
possibility of command influence. The Military Justice Act of 1968 redesignated
the law officers as military judges,' provided a statutory basis for the trial judiciary,
and attempted to safeguard their independence. 88  Furthermore, a general court-
martial might consist of "only a military judge, if before the court is assembled
the accused, knowing the identity of the military judge and after consultation,
with defense counsel, requests in writing a court composed only of a military
judge and the military judge approves."'8s Here then is authorized waiver of
jury-and without the consent of the Government, which is required in the federal
courts 90 Such a waiver is especially significant since in the traditional general
court-martial with lay members, the "military jury" not only returns the verdict but
also imposes the sentence.
to a summary court-martial for trial would have the practical effect of limiting the punishment imposable
to that which could be adjudged by a summary court-martial, even if the accused objected to trial by
summary court-martial and the charges were then referred to a special or general court-martial. Otherwise
the possibility of greater punishment would have a "chilling effect" on the accused's statutory right to
object to trial by court-martial. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). A similar argument
can be made with respect to the punishment imposable if an accused objects to nonjudicial punishment
and charges are referred for trial by court-martial. However, the Supreme Court has now made this
position seem almost untenable. Cf. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 US. X04 (X972).
"'5 See R. EvERanrr, supra note 42, at 145-57.
180 See 1.62 Hearing$ 838-40, 904-05, 936-37.
'8 7 U.C.M.J., arts. 1(1o), 26, 1o U.S.C. §§ 8o(1o), 826 (970). The redesignation of the "law
officer" to "military judge" is paralleled by the recent change of title from "hearing examiner" to "admin-
istrative law judge." 41 U.S.L.W. 2115.
I .'.U.CM.J., arts. 26(c), 37, io U.S.C. §§ 826(c), 837 (197o). The officer certified for duty as
military judge of general courts-martial is "directly responsible to the judge Advocate General, or his
designee."
"' U.C.M.J., art. 16(1)(B), so U.S.C. § 816(1)(B) (197o).
... FaD. R. Csms. P. 23(a); Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (x965).
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B. Special Courts-Martial
Before the Military Justice Act of 1968 special courts-martial could only consist of
not less than three members. Now alternative arrangements are possible. The court-
martial may consist of a military judge and not less than three members. Or, it may
be staffed by a military judge if one has been detailed to the court and the accused,
knowing his identity and after consultation with defense counsel, so requests in
writing, and the military judge approves.' 9 In the instance of the special court-
martial the military judge may -be, but is not required to be, a member of the
trial judiciary whose duties are solely of a judicial nature. Moreover, he is subject
to the influence of military commanders in the field through their power over his
assignments and through their control of his performance ratings' 2 Thus, for
special courts-martial there remains the possibility that a military commander-if he
is willing to achieve his end despite an express statutory prohibition in the Uniform
Code' 9 --may influence the military judge's performance of duties. Also, for the
special court-martial the military commander in the field may have some ability to
control what military judge will be assigned to a particular case.
The commander who serves as convening authority may also determine if the
special court-martial will have a military judge, since there is no statutory require-
ment that a special court-martial have a military judge. His discretion is, however,
severely limited in practice. For one thing, a special court-martial without a military
judge cannot impose a bad conduct discharge "except in any case in which a military
judge could not be detailed to the trial because of physical conditions or military
exigencies."'9 4 Furthermore, in any such case the convening authority must "make
a detailed written statement, to be appended to the record, stating the reason or
reasons a military judge could not be detailed."' 5 It is perfectly clear that Congress
intended for few cases, indeed, to be disposed of under this exception. Since many
of the cases referred to special court-martial would be those where the convening
authority would wish the court to be free to impose a bad conduct discharge, he will
be under considerable compulsion to appoint a military judge to the court-martial.
... U.C.M.J., art x6(2)(C), io U.S.C. § 816(2)(C) (1970).
... See U.C.M.J., art 26(c), io U.S.C. § 826(c) (1970). Article 37(b) provides that, in preparing
an effectiveness, fitness, or efficiency report, no one may "consider or evaluate the performance of
duty . . . as a member of a court-martial." U.C.M.J., art. 37(b), 1o U.S.C. § 837(b) (x97o). In this
context the word "member" may not include the "military judge" who has been detailed to a special
court-martial and who is not certified to serve as military judge of general courts-martial. However, any
omission in the statutory wording is remedied by the Manual provision that "a convening authority
shall not prepare or review any report concerning the effectiveness, fitness, or efficiency of a military
judge detailed to a special court-martial which relates to his performance of duty as a military judge."
MANUAL, 38e(2). The ratings in these reports are a major factor in determining an officer's assign-
ments, promotion, qualification for a regular commission, and retention in the service.
The Air Force has recently expanded its Trial Judiciary to provide 28 full-ime military judges for
special courts-martial. These officers will be assigned directly to the Office of the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral and thus will not be subject to efficiency ratings by commanders in the field. AFJAG Raa'oaTraa,
Aug., 1972, at 21.
108 U.C.M.J., art. 37, 10 U.S.C. § 837 (1970).
"°' U.C.M.J., art. ig, IO U.S.C. § 819 (1970).
Io Id.
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A second practical consideration is created by the increased presence of legally-
trained defense counsel in special courts-martial. Prior -to the Military Justice Act of
1968, there was no requirement that a military lawyer be assigned to represent the
accused, unless the prosecutor was a lawyer. Although the Air Force generally
provided lawyers both to prosecute and defend in special courts-martial, this was
not true in the Army and Navy.' The 1968 legislation required that the accused
be provided legally-trained counsel in special courts-martial "unless counsel having
such qualifications cannot be obtained on account of physical conditions or military
exigencies."" 7 Moreover, the convening authority must make a "detailed written
statement, to be appended to the record, stating why counsel with such qualification
could not be obtained."'"8 The result has been the appointment of military lawyers
as defense counsel in almost all special courts-martial tried since the 1968 Act took
effect' 99 If a lawyer is to defend, then generally the convening authority wishes
to have a lawyer as trial counsel-prosecutor-to protect the Government's interests.
In turn, experience has demonstrated that trial by a special court-martial composed
only of lay members in a case where lawyers are prosecuting and defending is
often very unsatisfactory. The members are frequently confused by legal issues as
to which they have available no impartial source of advice. Thus, another very
strong practical pressure exists for a convening authority to appoint a military judge
to a special court-martial.
Before the requirement existed that lawyers be appointed to defend an accused
tried by a special court-martial, a convening authority had considerable leeway to
influence the quality of the defense, for among the non-legally-trained officers ap-
pointed as defense counsel in special courts-martial the aptitude for court-martial
practice and the zeal displayed might vary markedly. Even today the convening
authority is in a position to affect the quality of defense representation by his
decisions concerning which lawyers in his command will be appointed or made
available as defense counsel. However, the accused is assured at least a minimal level
of skill on the part of his counsel, for the lawyer must be a licensed attorney or the
graduate of an accredited law school and must also be certified by the Judge Advocate
of his armed force as being competent to defend general courts-martial.200 Moreover,
the Air Force has undertaken a pilot program for trial teams composed of full-time
trial and defense counsel to prosecute and defend general and special courts-martial.
296 2962 Hearings 837-38, 903, 935. The Court of Military Appeals did not consider legally-traincd
defense counsel to be constitutionally required in a special court-martial, even when a bad conduct dis-
charge was adjudged. See United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963).
""U.C.M.J., art. 27(c)(1), io U.S.C. § 827(c)(1) (197o).
... The Military Justice Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 1355, took effect on Aug. I, x969. The requirement
that legally-trained counsel be provided in connection with special courts-martial created an added need
for lawyers in the Army and the Navy.
2 0 0
U.C.M.J., art. 27, IO U.S.C. § 827 (1970).
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In addition to their greater experience, the members of the trial team are insulated
more fully from command influence on their performance. 0 1
C. Summary Courts-Martial
In a summary court-martial the convening authority, who is not disqualified by
any personal interest, appoints a commissioned officer who serves as the summary
court-martial. While neither the Code nor the Manual contemplate the appointment
of counsel for such a court-martial, the recent ruling of the Supreme Court in
Argprsinger v. Hamlin °= requires a reassessment in this regard. However, the
military establishment may take the position that the absolute right to object to trial
by summary court-martial-in which event the case will only be tried by special or
general court-martial where legally-trained counsel are provided-distinguishes the
Argersinger case.
2 03
201 On June i, 1971, the pilot project for the Air Force Judiciary Trial Division officially began its
test period. This project, which was discussed in the January a, 1970-December 31, 1970 report,
is one in which some 15 judge advocates were assigned as fulltime trial and defense counsel and
special court-martial military judges within geographical districts within the 2d Circuit of the
eastern U.S. Judiciary Region. They work out of offices at Maxwell AFB, Ala., Keesler AFB, Miss.,
MacDill AFB, Fla., and Shaw AFB, S.C. All report directly to the Judge Advocate General rather
than field commanders. The test period was concluded 'on November 30, 1971, and is currently
undergoing an evaluation with a view toward determining its feasibility for worldwide adoption.
1971 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 33. A similar approach was suggested in x962 by Dean A.
Kenneth Pye. See 1962 Hearings 548-49. The pilot program has apparently been successful and is being
expanded. See AFJAG REPORTER, Aug., 1972, at 21. With respect to counsel, the Task Force has recom-
mended that there be provided:
[a]dequate legal facilities and services to military judges and military counsel, including proper
office equipment, adequate legal libraries, private offices for defense counsel and trial counsel,
separated so that they will not appear to be working out of the same organization, and necessary
logistical and administrative support (e.g., paralegal representation and enlisted investigative
assistants).... [t]he senior circuit judge appoint members of court and detail the military judge
and defense counsel made available to him. Members of the trial judiciary be placed under the
direction of the appropriate Judge Advocate General. All judge advocate defense counsel be placed
under the direction of the appropriate Judge Advocate General or, in the case of the Marine
Corps, the Director, Judge Advocate Division, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. In view
of the critical need for more minority lawyers, the feasibility of contracting for a pool of minority
civilian defense counsel from which the military could draw, as needed, be explored; and adequate
funds be made available to the services for the express purpose of expanding their efforts in
recruiting minority lawyers. Military counsel be provided with additional training in human
relations and in communicating with minority persons.
TAsK FoRcE REPORT X24-25.
202 407 US. 25 (1972)-
"° U.C.M.J., art. 20, i0 U.S.C. § 820 (1970). In four summary court-martial cases the Judge
Advocate General of the Army has set aside the confinement portion of the sentence since the accused
were neither represented by lawyer counsel at trial nor did the accused knowingly and intelligently
waive their right to representation by lawyer counsel. 72-14 JUnoa ADVOCATE LEA L SExvicE § Il(3)
(DA Pam 27-72-14). For a federal district court holding that .4rgersinger applies to summary courts-
martial, see Daigle v. Warner, 348 F. Supp. 1074 (D. Hawaii 1972). Under the same reasoning, does
Argersinger apply to nonjudicial punishment involving correctional custody?
The Task Force has recommended a decrease in the use of the summary court-martial with a view
toward its eventual abolishment. Pending this, the Task Force suggests several modifications to ensure
the appearance of fairness in the operation of summary courts-martial. These include: only judge
advocates should be appointed to sit as summary court-martial officers; counsel should be detailed to
represent the accused and the Government; the nature of the summary court-martial should be an
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D. Determining the Number of Court Members
Neither a general court martial nor a special court-martial need contain a pre-
scribed number of members--only a minimum number. Thus, the convening au-
thority can determine the number of members to serve on the court-martial, subject
to the right of the accused to reduce this number by use of peremptory challenge
or challenge for cause. The number appointed may be significant, since military
justice does not require a unanimous verdict and findings of guilty may be returned
by a two-thirds vote.204 From the standpoint of an accused contesting guilt, a court-
martial composed of five or eight members is preferable to one composed of six or
nine members. 05
E. Pretrial Instruction
Prior to the Military Justice Act of 1968 a convening authority could instruct or
lecture prospective court-martial members, and if the instructions were sufficiently
astute, they would not fall within the proscription of unlawful influence on a court-
martia2 °6 Article 37 of the 'Code now markedly limits this practice.207 It also im-
poses other limitations on actions of the convening authority that might tend to
influence court members. However, he still retains the power to appoint the mem-
bers; and, so the criticism goes, he can manipulate his appointments in a way that
will stack the court. Furthermore, the court members are still usually the military
subordinates of the commander who appoints them.
F. Enlisted Membership
In the instance of enlisted accused, the commander's discretion is limited by the
right of an enlisted man to request in writing that the membership of his court-
adversary proceeding; the evidence of conviction by summary court-martial should be removed from
an accused's field file upon reenlistment or release from active duty; and summary courts-martial should
be empowered to impose correctional custody.
Although a minority of the Task Force felt that the summary court-martial still serves a valid
purpose and provides a useful Iarray of options for the benefit of the accused, the majority believed
that elimination of the summary court would achieve three important results: the ends of justice would
be better served; fewer persons would have their records marred by court-martial convictions; and trial
by special court-martial would involve adequate'procedural protection of the rights of the individual
accused. TAsk FoP=z REPOar 76-77.
... U.C.J., art. 52, 1o U.S.C. § 852 (1970). CI. Apodaca v. Oregon, 4o6 U.S. 404 (972)
(unanimous verdict is not required as part of the constitutional right to a jury trial); Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (right to jury trial does not require twelve-member jury).
"I See R. EvEam-r, supra note 42, at 179.
2 0 See, e.g., United States v. Danzine, 12 U.S.C1MA. 350, 30 C.M.R. 350 (196i). Paragraph 38 of
the 1951 Manual for Courts-Martial authorized the convening authority to give "general instruction to
the personnel of a court-martial which he has appointed, preferably before any cases have been referred
to the court for trial. . . . Such instruction may relate to the rules of evidence, burden of proof, and
presumption of innocence, and may include information as to the state of discipline in the command,
as to the prevalence of offenses which have impaired efficiency and discipline, and of command measures
which have been taken to prevent offenses." Because of complaints about the practice of giving pretrial
instruction to prospective court-martial members, the Army discontinued this practice in 1962. See
1962 'Hearings 869, 923 ("Handbook for Court Members" sponsored by the Navy to obviate the need
for special instructions to-court members).
"'0U.C.M.J., art. 37, io U.S.C. § 837 (1970).
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martial be comprised of at least one-third enlisted personnel. 08 As this right is
implemented by the Manual for Courts-Martial, it applies throughout the trial, so
that, if by challenges, illness, or otherwise, the enlisted membership of the court-
martial is reduced below one-third, then the trial cannot proceed20 The one-third
requirement can be valuable to an enlisted accused whose defense counsel foresees
that enlisted members of a court-martial would probably vote to acquit. By
peremptorily challenging an officer member of the court-martial, the defense can
increase the enlisted membership above one-third and thereby prevent the Government
from obtaining the two-thirds vote required for conviction. Such cases, however, do
not arise in practice. Instead, many experienced defense counsel have found that
when an accused requests enlisted membership, those appointed are typically senior
non-commissioned officers with a predisposition toward the prosecution. Military
commanders have found authorization for such appointments in the Uniform Codes
mandate that a convening authority detail as members persons "who are best
qualified for the duty by reason of age, education-training, experience, length of
service, and judicial temperament.""21 Many military commanders seem to believe
that no enlisted man could be better qualified within these guidelines than a top
sergeant or a chief petty officer. The Court of Military Appeals permits this view.2 '-
Thus, provisions for enlisted court membership have become almost a dead letter
because of defense reluctance to utilize this option.
G. Selection of Court Members
The Uniform Code directs that "when it can be avoided, no member of an armed
force may be tried by a court-martial any member of which is junior to him in rank
or grade."21 To some extent this standard may reflect the deference afforded rank
by military custom. It may also be grounded on very practical concerns that a
subordinate of the accused might be influenced by fear, resentment, or some other
improper motive. In any event, it provides no serious limitation on the discretion of
a convening authority who wishes to "stack" membership of a court-martial to achieve
a particular result.
Various legislative proposals have been made to limit the discretion of military
commanders in the appointment of court members. Some would remove completely
the power of the military commander to appoint the members of a court-martial to
which he refers charges?'13 Other proposals would require random selection of
court members from a predesignated roster, appointment of court members from
.0 U.C.M.J., art. 25(C), 1o U.S.C. S 825(c) (1970).
... MANUALt, t 624(4).
"" U.C.M.J., alt. 25 (d)(2), io U.S.C. § 825(d)(2) (1970). Cf. Carter v. jury Comn'r, 396 U.S. 320
(1970).
.. United States v. Crawford, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 35 C.M.R. 3 (1964), discussed in 1965 Durt L.J.
633. Por criticism of this case and of prevailing practice in the selection of court-martial members, see
Remcho, Military Juries: Constitutional Analysis and the Need for Reform, 47 IND. L.J. 193 (1972). See
also United States v. Greene, 2o U.S.C.M.A. 232, 43 C.M.R. 72 (970).21 2 U.C.M.j., art. 25(d)(1), 1o U.S.C. § 825(d)(1) (1970).1 Bayh, supra note 3, at ig; Sherman, supra note 3, at 45.
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the lower enlisted grades for the trial of enlisted personnel, or appointment of court
members from different military commands.2 14 Although such proposals would
eliminate some of the opportunities for abuse that have been complained of, none
would completely remove every possibility of abuse, since the court members would
still be military personnel who might feel subject to the possibility of military reprisal
by a disgruntled commander.
While several of these proposals would require enabling legislation, some of them
could be implemented administratively. For example, by agreement between military
commanders, court-martial members could be appointed who were not under the
command of the convening authority. Of course, even in that instance the possibility
of reprisal pursuant to agreement between the commanders involved would still
exist; and, in practice, commanders would probably be reluctant to spare members
of their own organization to help solve the disciplinary problems of another organiza-
tion. Similarly, random selection could be utilized by a commander. With the
aid of his personnel officers he could appoint members of his command who were
selected on a random basis from the officers in his command. 1 Conceivably, how-
ever, under the existing provisions of the Code, random selection might be regarded
as inconsistent with the exercise of the commander's discretion in choosing the
"best qualified," as contemplated by the statutory wording 1
V
TwAL
As has already been explained, the convening authority determines if charges
will be referred for trial by court-martial, and his determination may be at odds
with the recommendations of an Article 32 investigating officer or of the convening
authority's own staff judge advocate. Furthermore, it appears from the Manual
for Courts-Martial that a trial counsel has no independent power to refuse to
prosecute a case which the convening authority wishes tried. According to the
Manual, a trial counsel who, while preparing a case for trial, discovers that trial
would be inadvisable is directed to "inform the convening authority at once. 1
217
"4 Id. See also Remcho, supra note 211, at 223-29.
... in one case random selection was apparently used by a convening authority in appointing court-
martial members. See Remcho, supra note 21r, at 21g. The Task Force has recommended selection of
court members on a random basis and that "[a]dditional peremptory challenges to he court members
be permitted by both prosecution and defense, with the defense having a greater number than the
prosecution." TAsK Fo RcE REPORT 125.
"' The language of Article 25 seems to contemplate that the commander who convenes a court-
martial will use his personal discretion in choosing court members. U.C.M.J., art. 25(d)(2), Io U.S.C.
§ 823(d)(2) (1970). In one sense random selection is the antithesis of conscious selection by a com-
mander of the persons whom he deems best qualified to perform duties as court members pursuant to the
standards prescribed in Article 25(d)(2). On the other hand, there is a rational exercise of discretion
in a commander's choice to utilize the principle of random selection. United States v. Kemp, No. 25,893
(U.S.C.f.A., filed Nov. 20, 1972), now pending in the Court of Military Appeals, raises the question
of the extent to which the convening authority must be personally involved in the various aspects of
selecting court members.
.. MANUAL, 441(5).
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Obviously the convening authority is to make the final determination whether trial
will proceed.
Unlike civil courts where venue is an important concept, military justice does not
designate the place where a trial by court-martial may be conducted. Thus, a
convening authority has some discretion as to the place at which an accused may be
brought to trial. Change of venue is authorized but only when "there exists at the
place of trial so great a general atmosphere of prejudice against him that he cannot
obtain a fair and impartial trial in that place. '218
A convening authority may direct that an offense that otherwise would be
capital shall be tried as noncapital. 2 19 By so doing, he may affect the rules of evidence
applicable to the case, especially with respect to depositions, which are not admissible
in behalf of the prosecution in capital cases.22° Also, the convening authority may
be involved in a decision concerning the right of the defense to subpoena a civilian
witness221-although the matter may be reopened at trial. He may forbid the taking
of depositions before trial.222 At the trial, if a charge has been held to be defective
and inadequate to allege an offense, the matter is referred to the convening authority
for action.2ss
Plea bargaining is a prevalent feature of civilian criminal justice. Similarly it is
employed within the military establishment, although not in all the armed forces.
For a decade the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps have utilized plea bargaining; the
Air Force, on the other hand, forbids it.22 In the military procedure for plea bar-
gaining, the convening authority who has referred a case for trial plays a major
role. Upon the initiative of the defense counsel, a written agreement is entered
between the accused and the convening authority that, if the accused pleads guilty,
the convening authority will approve no sentence in excess of that which is agreed
upon. The agreement sets only a ceiling, but not a floor. The defense counsel is
still under a duty to seek the lowest possible sentence from the court-martial, the
members of which are unaware of the agreement between the accused and the
convening authority. If the sentence imposed proves -to be greater than that which
has been agreed upon, then the convening authority reduces the sentence as re-
quired. On the other hand, if the sentence adjudged is below that which has been
M MANUAL, 69e.
.1 MANUAL, i5a(3).
220 U.C.MJ., art. 49, 10 U.S.C. § 849(a) (1970); MAtAL, tJ 145a.
" MANUAL, 145a. The convening authority may also be involved in determining whether certain
confidential and secret evidence is made available to defense counsel. MANUAL, i 5 Ib(3).
222 See U.C.MJ., art. 49(a), 1o U.S.C. § 849(a) (1970).
22'MANUAL, 67f; 69b; U.C.MJ., art. 62(a), io U.S.C. § 862(a) (1970); Priest v. Koch, ig
U.S.C.M.A. 293, 41 C.M.R. 293 (1970). Under Article 62, the convening authority may review a
military judge's ruling favorable to the accused on a motion to dismiss; however, he cannot make find-.
ings of fact contrary to those of the judge. U.C.M.J., art. 62, 2o U.S.C. § 862 (1970). See United States
v. Frazier, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 444, 45 C.M.R. 228 (2972).
02" For a discussion of the plea bargaining practices in the various armed services, see z962 Hearings
843, 870, 905, 923, 937, 957. See also the judges' view on the negotiated guilty plea program as ex-
pressed in United States v. Watdns, ii U.S.C.M.A. 611, 29 C.M.R. 427 (i96o). See McMenamin, Plea
Bargaining in the Military, io AM. Cian. L. Rav. 93 (1971).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
agreed upon, there is no procedure for increasing it and the accused receives a
windfall of sorts. This procedure, which conforms to all constitutional require-
ments,22 5 gives the convening authority a discretion and responsibility that many
judges do not possess. However, unlike plea bargaining in some civil courts, the
bargained plea in the military is embodied in a document before trial.220
VI
APPELLATE REVIEw
The military commander who convenes a court-martial has considerable dis-
cretion in the review of its decision. While he is expected to rely upon the advice
of his staff judge advocate, he retains final responsibility. It is in his power to
review the facts, law, and sentence, but his discretion can be exercised only in behalf
of the accused. 2 s The discretion to grant clemency is an absolute one, and can be
predicated upon information, such as lie detector results, which would be inadmissible
in a trial. 29 The convening authority can determine whether to suspend all or
part of a sentence;'30 he may defer confinement under certain circumstances;2. and
he designates the place of confinement, subject to applicable regulations of his military
department.232 Thus, the initial determination as to rehabilitation is that of the
convening authority.
It has been suggested that the broad discretion of the commander is so great that
it may sometimes produce an adverse effect on the accused at the trial. Court mem-
bers may conclude that they should impose a severe sentence and rely on the
discretion of the convening authority to reduce it to a suitable level. Obviously such
reasoning by court members would violate their sworn responsibility 38
Perhaps in response to the possibilities of abuse at the trial level, Congress has
provided for extensive appellate review of courts-martial. For example, in addition
to initial review 'by -the convening authority, a Court of Military Review must
review any case in which there is a punitive discharge or confinement for a year or
"2'In United States v. Care, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 535, 40 C.M.R. 247 (1969), the Court of Military
Appeals acted to assure that military pleas of guilty would conform to the requirements of Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (969), and McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
2" See McMenandn, supra note 224, at 95, who favors the visibility of the written pretrial agreement.
The military procedure tends to avoid problems like those present in Santobello v. New York, 402 U.S.
994 (197).
2"' See MANum., 85c. However, if he disagrees with his staff judge advocate, the convening authority
should state the reasons for that disagreement. See also id., gra. The Task Force has recommended that
"[i]n other than capital cases, automatic review of all general courts-martial and special courts-martial
in which a bad conduct discharge is approved by the convening authority be eliminated, except for a
clemency review by the convening authority, providing instead for review by the appellate judiciary of
only those cases appealed by the accused." TAsK FoacE REPonT x25-26.
2s Cf. U.C.M.J., arts. 62-64, 1o U.S.C. §§ 862-64 (1970).
:' United States v. Massey, 5 U.S.C.M.A 514, 18 C.M.R. 138 (1955).
.:°U.CaJ., art. 7I(d), 1O U.S.C. § 871(d) (z97o).
= u.C..J., art. 57(d), zo U.S.C. § 857(d) (1970).
" UMANue, f i89c(5).
I' Cf. United States v. Ellis, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 8, 34 C.M.R. 454 (1964).
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more 34 In other cases, the Judge Advocate General of the appropriate service may
act to correct error prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused." 5 A petition
for new trial is available.23 0 And further relief may be secured through certain
administrative boards.
2 37
The Court of Military Appeals may review cases which have been reviewed by
a Court of Military Review. For the most part the grant of review is discretionary
and is upon an accused's petition for review. Like a Supreme Court denial of
certiorari, the denial of a petition for review by the Court of Military Appeals is
without a formal opinion. Thus, the criteria for the exercise of its discretion to
review can only be surmisedasO
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Traditionally American military commanders, from the Commander-in-Chief
down to the company commander, have enjoyed considerable discretion in dis-
ciplining their troops. Not surprisingly, the scope of the discretion committed to a
a commander frequently depends on his rank, his position in the chain of com-
mand, and sometimes on his service. Thus, some of the nonjudicial punishments
permissible under Article 15 depend on the rank of the commander who admin-
isters the punishment 4 An Army company commander or Air Force squadron
commander generally has no authority to convene any sort of court-martial; he can
simply transmit charges, with his recommendations, to a higher echelon of command.
The captain of a naval or Coast Guard vessel can convene a summary or special
court-martial, and as to personnel "attached to or embarked in" his vessel, he may
even impose confinement on bread and water, without any election on the part of
the accused to elect trial by court-martial 41
To some extent -the rank of a commander may affect the quality of the justice
he administers. Usually there will be some correlation between rank on the one
hand, and experience and training on the other. Hopefully, therefore, a seasoned
colonel will be able to administer justice more impartially and beneficially than
a new lieutenant. However, the converse may be true, and the years of experience
may simply reinforce existing prejudices.
The rank of the accused may also affect the scope of the discretion available
." U.C.M.J., art. 66, io U.S.C. § 866 (970).
U.C.MJ., art. 69, 1o U.S.C. § 869 (1970). See also Everett, Collateral Attack on Court-Martial
Convictions, ii A.F. JAG L. REV. 399 (,969).
-0 U.C.M.J., art. 73, io U.S.C. § 873 (1970).
230 0 U.S.C. § X553 (1970) (Discharge Review Boards) and io U.S.C. § 1552 (970) (Cor-
rection Boards).
2118 U.C.MJ., art. 67(b), xo U.S.C. § 867(b) (1970). However, mandatory review is provided for
capital cases and those involving general or flag officers. Also, the judge Advocate General of an armed
service can certify to the court for decision questions arising in cases decided by the Court of Military
Review.
"' The court's most recent annual report reveals that as of June 30, 197T, it had granted 2,845
petitions for review and had denied 20,793. 1971 ANNUAL REPoRT, supra note 3, at 15.
210U.C.M.J., art. 15(b), 3o U.S.C. § 85(b) (1970).
2" U.C.M.J., art. i5(a), 30 U.S.C. § 815(a) (1970).
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to his commander in administering justice. For example, officers may be prosecuted
for certain conduct that would not be an offense on the part of an enlisted man 4
With respect to nonjudicial punishments, the limitations applicable to officers and
enlisted personnel are quite distinct; and as to enlisted personnel the grade of
the accused is important in determining the reduction in grade that may be im-
posed.2 43 No commander-whatever his rank or position-has the power to refer
charges against an officer to a summary court-martial for trial2 44 No officer may
be sentenced to hard labor without confinement.2 45 An officer dismissed by order
of the President has a right to a trial by general court-martial,240 and a sentence ex-
tending to dimissal of an officer must be approved by the secretary of the military
department. 47 Cases involving general and flag officers bring into play additional
requirements of review.248
Congress has sought to limit the discretion of commanders in administering
military justice by providing some unique safeguards for service personnel. The de-
tailed appellate review of findings and sentence-which extends to the weight of
the evidence and the appropriateness of the sentence,24 the Article 31 warning
required in pretrial interrogation,250 and the Article 32 pretrial investigation which
must precede trial by general court-martial,2 ' are among these safeguards. Another
protection is afforded by the privilege granted any member of the armed forces to
make a complaint of wrongs against his commanding officer?52
In shielding service personnel against abuses of discretion, military justice has
placed great reliance on the numerous elections and options offered to an accused.
Unless attached to or embarked in a vessel, he may refuse nonjudicial punishment.2 3
He possesses an absolute right to object to trial by summary court-martial. 4 In a
S242 ee, e.g., Articles 88 (contempt toward officials) and 133 (conduct unbecoming an officer and
gentleman), U.C.M.J., io U.S.C. §§ 888, 933 (970).
2' U.C.MJ., art. i5(b) (2) (H) (iv), xo U.S.C. 5 81s(b) (2) (H) (iv) (1970).
2 44U.C.MJ., art. 20, zo U.S.C. § 820 (1970).
' MANUAL, ifld. The 1951 Manual for Courts-Martial had provided that an officer could not
be sentenced to confinement or total forfeitures of pay unless he was also sentenced to dismissal; but this
provision was held to be contrary to the Uniform Code. See United States v. Madison, X4 U.S.C.M.A.
655, 34 C.M.R. 435 (7964); United States v. Smith, so U.S.C.M.A. 752, 27 C.M.R. 227 (x959).
2.. U.C.MJ., art. 4, 7o U.S.C. § 804 (1970).
a47U.C.MJ., art. 71(b); 7o U.S.C. § 871(b) (1970).
218U.C.M.J., art. 67(b)(7), IO U.S.C. § 867(b)(7) (797o) (mandatory review by Court of Military
Appeals); U.C.MJ., art. 71(a), 10 U.S.C. § 871(a) (x970) (approval by the President). The mandatory
review for general and flag officers was held to be based upon a reasonable classification. See United
States v. Gallagher, x5 U.S.C.M.A. 391, 35 C.M.I,. 363 (7965).
249 U.CM.J., arts. 64, 66, 69, 70 U.S.C. §§ 864, 866, 869 (1970).
2°U.ClvLf, art. 31, 10 U.S.C. § 837 (1970).
2"5 U.CJ.MJ., art. 32, 10 U-S.C. § 832 (1970).
"'U.C.M.J., art. 738, xo U.S.C. § 938 (1970). The Court of Military Appeals has recognized Article
.138 as a proper means to question the legality of pretrial or post-trial confinement. Dale v. United States,
X9 U.S.C.M.A. 254, 41 C.M.R. 254 (7970); Walker v. United States, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 247, 47 C.M.R. 247
(7970). However, the armed services apparently take the position that, except as to confinement, the
Article does not concern matters involving discipline. See OpJAGAF 1972/x (Oct. 17, 7972); OpJAGAF
x972/53 (Apr. 26, 1972).
"53U.C.M.J.. art. I5(a), 7O U.S.C. § 815(a) (1970).
25 U.C.M.J., art. 20, 70 U.S.C. § 820 (1970).
DISCRETION IN MILITARY JUSTICE
special or general court-martial the accused may, with the military judge's consent,
waive trial by the military jury and elect to be tried and sentenced by the judge
alone. 55 An enlisted accused may require that the jury of a special or general court-
martial which tries him contain at least one-third enlisted personnel at all times.256 The
cieation of these various rights and the customary requirement that a waiver of
the rights be knowing and intelligent has necessitated the increasing availability of
military lawyers to advise accused persons concerning the alternatives available to
them.
In addition to the more obvious limitations that the Uniform Code has placed
on a commander's discretion, there are others which are less visible. For example, if
a commander fails, under some circumstances, to assign a military judge or a legally
qualified military defense counsel to a special court-martial, he must attach to the
record of trial his explanation of the necessities which required the use of laymen.5 '
Similarly, if 'he- fails to accept the post-trial recommendation of his staff judge
advocate, the commander must attach to the record the reasons for this disagree-
ment.25 ' The necessity of the explanation and the possibility that it might later be
scrutinized judicially and found wanting, undoubtedly induce considerable reluctance
in a commander to take the action that might appear to be within his discretion.
A commander still retains the authority to refer cases to a special court-martial
that consists only of lay members and has no military judge.2 59 However, by limit-
ing the punishment which such a court-martial could impose and by providing for
the presence of legally-trained defense counsel in almost all special courts-martial, 6 O
Congress has created a situation where a commander would seldom feel that it was
practical to appoint a special court-martial that had no military judge. Similarly,
while the Uniform Code does not require that the trial counsel-prosecutor-in special
courts-martial must be an attorney, the provision that legally-trained defense counsel
be provided in such courts compels the commander to appoint a lawyer to prosecute
in order to avoid a mismatch of legal skills that might be disastrous for the Govern-
ment's case.
Just as the alternatives available to a commander may be less meaningful than at
first appears, so to, the choices available for an accused may have some restrictions not
at first apparent. For example, the opportunity of an accused to elect trial by an
enlisted court-martial is diminished in significance by the right of the commander
to appoint as enlisted members senior non-commissioned officers who usually would
be oriented to the prosecution.2 8 '
Since 1951 when the Uniform Code of Military Justice took effect, there have
"' U.CM.J., art. 16, io U.S.C. § 816 (1970).
... U.C.MJ., art. 25(c), 10 U.S.C. § 825(c) (1970).
217U.C.MJ., arts. 19, 27(c)(1), 1o U.S.C. H§ 819, 827(c)(I) (1970).
.. ~~. MANALt 8~5C, 9gi.
2'5U.C.MJ., art. x6(2) (A), io U.S.C. § 816(2) (A) (1970).
... U.C.J., arts. X9, 27(C)(I), Io U.S.C. §§ 81g, 827(c)(1) (1970).
21 United States v. Crawford, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 35 C.M.R. 3 (1964).
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emerged many new limitations on the discretion of commanders in administering
military justice. Many of those limitations were imposed by the decisions of the
Court of Military Appeals, a civilian tribunal created by the Code. For example,
this court expanded pretrial safeguards," 2 helped transform the "law officer" of a
general court-martial into a "military judge,"263 required detailed instructions con-
cerning the evidence and the offenses, 264 gave new meaning to appellate review,21
and created extraordinary remedies. 66 The court deprived the Manual for Courts-
Martial, prescribed by the President, of its stature as a "bible" for the military
lawyer. 67
The various military departments promulgated regulations and developed policies
which limited the discretion of commanders in the field. For example, the Army,
Navy, and Marine Corps, while authorizing a commander to accept or decline a
proposed negotiated guilty plea, have required that the bargain be embodied in a
written pretrial agreement, so that it is visible and will not be subject to misunder-
standing concerning the terms.
The Army's initiative in developing a trial judiciary-law officers who were
allowed to specialize in military justice and were insulated from possible command
influence in the field-has had a major impact on military justice. Together with
the decisions of the Court of Military Appeals, this innovation, swiftly adopted by
the Navy and Marine Corps, led to congressional provision for "military judges"
in both general and special courts-martial. 68 In turn, creation of this new position-
and the prestige, independence, and power provided for it-has had the practical effect
of reducing the discretion available to military commanders in administering military
justice. Various types of decisions previously made by commanders are gradually
being transferred to military judges. In a similar manner, the Army has now pro-
vided for "military magistrates," who are authorized to make determinations con-
cerning searches and seizures and pretrial confinement that previously were entrusted
solely to commanders. 69
The enactment of the Military Justice Act of 1968 reflected a congressional intent
2"See, e.g., United States v. Tempia, x6 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 36 C.M.R. 249 (1967); United States
v. Wilson, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 248, 8 C.MKR. 48 (1953).
..3 For different opinions concerning this transformation, see Quinn, Courts-Martal Pracice: A View
from the Top, 22 HAr. LJ. 201, 2o8-io (1971); Miller, Who Made the Law Officer a "Federal Judge"?,
4 MAiL. L. RYV. 39 (1959)-
6 I See, e.g., United States v. Arnie, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 514, 22 C.M.R. 304 (957); United States v. Clay,
i U.S.C.M.A. 74, x C.M.R. 74 (r951).
'See, e.g., United States v. Chandler, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 73, 46 C.M.R. 73 (1972); United States v.
Massey, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 514, i8 CM.R. 138 (1955); United States v. Coulter, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 657, 14 C.M.R.
75 (1954).
2"See, e.g., United States v. Synder, I8 U.S.C.M.A. 480, 40 C.M.R. 192 (1969); United States v.
Bevilacqua, x8 U.S.C.M.A. 10, 39 C.M.R. io (z968); Everett, supra note 235.
2 As to the change in the court's attitude toward the Manual, compare United States v. Hemp, i
U.S.C.M.A. 280, 3 C.M.R. i4 (x952), with United States v. Rinehart, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 145, 23 C.M.R. 369
(1957). See also Quinn, supra note 263, at 203-;08.
211 U.C.M.J., art. 26, iO U.S.C. § 826 (1970).
"'See I971 ANNUAL REPoRT, stpra note 3, at 3, 21;
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to curtail in certain ways the discretion of military commanders. Thus, the strength-
ening of prohibitions on command influence was intended to remove a commander's
discretion to take certain action that might influence the outcome of a trial by
court-martial.2 0 The requirement that legally-trained counsel be assigned in special
courts-martial was designed to lessen significantly the scope of the commander's
discretion in appointing defense counsel for such courts."'
However, the Uniform Code and the 1969 amendments thereof limited com-
manders' discretion in one way that probably was not fully appreciated. By making
military justice far more technical and complicated, Congress-together with the
Court of Military Appeals-has created a situation where a commander feels far
more dependent on his legal advisers. At least as to serious offenses, the alternatives
for commanders have become so much more complicated that, regardless of the
discretion provided them by statute, they can hardly feel much confidence in
disregarding recommendations of their legal advisers. In short, for purposes of
military justice, as in many other areas, the military commander has become much
more dependent on the technician; and so, in practical effect, his discretion has been
reduced.
Another result of the increasing complexity of military justice is the use by
commanders of alternatives other than court-martial in maintaining discipline.
Assignments of duty, promotions or demotions, administrative discharge, release
from active duty or call to duty have been among the means available. Use of these
alternatives was often more attractive because of a traditional judicial reluctance to
review assignments of military duties and similar matters.2 72 However, in some
instances the federal courts found authority to correct abuses of discretion involved
in disciplinary measures other than trial by court-martial. Especially with respect
to administrative dischargesr 3 the courts have acted to limit the discretion of military
commanders-sometimes by finding violations of the regulations of the military
department involved.
Of much greater impact in limiting military discretion was the Supreme Court's
decision in O'Callahan v. Parker,"4 which ruled that-subject to some possible
exceptions-even offenses committed by servicemen could not be tried by court-
martial unless those offenses were service-connected. The rationale of O'Callahan is
especially noteworthy since it transcends questions of court-mardal jurisdiction and
concerns the substantive power of military commanders to regulate the conduct of
their personnel in matters not clearly service-connected.
From one direction or another, further inroads may be anticipated on the dis-
cretion of military commanders in administering military justice. Probably the
270 U.C.M.j., art. 37, 10 U.S.C. § 837 (1970).
27 1U.C.j.., art. 27(c)(I), Io U.S.C. § 827(c)(1) (970).
"22Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
-0 Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958); Everett, supra note 104, at 41.
24' 395 U.S. 258 (x969)-
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summary court-martial will disappear from the scene-at least in its present form.
The role and power of the military judge will increase, and with it will come a
diminution of the authority of military commanders. It seems likely that soon the
military judge will be empowered to issue all the writs authorized by the All Writs
Act,-76 will be ruling on search and arrest questions and the issuance of warrants,
will be granting releases from pretrial and post-trial confinement, and will become
even more involved in the sentencing process, even without specific waiver by the
accused of his right to be tried by military jury.
The incessant complaints about composition and selection of courts-martial may
soon diminish sharply as changes occur in the procedures for selecting court mem-
bers. Greater use of random selection of such members seems increasingly probable,
but the high percentage of waivers of trial by jury may reduce the importance of the
entire issue. Furthermore, recent Supreme Court decisions which have altered pre-
vailing conceptions of the constitutional right to "trial by jury" tend to reduce
criticisms that military justice deprives an accused of his right to jury trial.
Whatever the commander's role may become in the selection of court-martial
members, he will probably retain a major role in determining which offenses are
tried by court-martial. Thus, he will continue to share in that discretion usually
enjoyed by prosecuting attorneys. His role in the process of appellate review may
become more limited-partly in response to the more technical nature of the issues
presented during this review and partly because of the desirability of transferring
clemency and rehabilitation decisions to experts in penology and corrections.
In response to complaints in Congress and elsewhere that racial discrimination
occurs in the administration of military justice, a task force established by the Depart-
ment of Defense has recently been studying military justice. Its report deals both
with.intentional discrimination 7 and systemic discrimination;178 and the recom-
mendations extend to preservice educational factors, equal opportunity programs,
job assignments and testing, regulation of personal appearance, updating racial and
ethnic identity codes, and administrative discharges. As to the military justice
system, the Task Force Report recommends various changes in nonjudicial punish-
ment, 79 decreased use of summary courts-martial, 280 increased stature for military
judges and counsel, random selection of court members, reduction of the convening
. Over the years there have been many recommendations for abolition of summary courts-martial.
Now, as a result of the decision in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), their continued use may
be unfeasible. See note 203, supra.
276 28 U.S.C. § x65i(a) (1970).
77The Task Force has defined intentional .discrimination as "a policy of an authority-especially
in the context of our study, a military authority--or action of an individual or group of individuals
,which is intended to' have a negative effect on minority individuals or groups without 'having such
an effect on others." TAsc FoRcE RPoRT i8-ig.
270Systemic discrimination has been defined as "policies or practices which appear to be neutral
in their effect on minority individuals or groups but which have the effect of disproportionately
impacting upon them in harmful or negative ways." .Id.
17 Supra note 1o5..r
2 8OSupra note 227. Summary courts-martial have very minimal use currently in the Air Force.
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authority's role in appellate review, codification of offenses currently tried under
Article 134,21 and better military justice training.212 Aside from the recommendations
concerning nonjudicial punishment, as to which the effects are hard to predict, the
Report does not seem to call for drastic revision in the military justice system.
Perhaps-but not probably-some new task force or investigative group will
bring to light some abuses not previously suspected. In that event drastic new
restrictions may be imposed administratively or legislatively on the discretion of
commanders in maintaining discipline and punishing crime.
For example, jurisdiction of all offenses committed within the United States by
service personnel might be transferred from courts-martial to federal district courts, so
that the United States Attorney, rather than a military commander, would make the
decision as to which offenses would be prosecuted. And even as to offenses com-
mitted overseas, greater civilian influence might be provided-perhaps replacing
the "military judges" with civilian judges.
Up to this point, the case for new major changes in military justice does not
seem to have been proved. Indeed, Congress will probably wish to allow further
opportunity for evaluation of the existing system, as substantially amended by the
Military Justice Act of 1968 and by various innovations and pilot programs that
have been initiated by the armed services. Thus, for the foreseeable future it seems
likely that military commanders will continue to enjoy broad discretion in the
administration of justice.
...This specificity has also been recommended by the Court of Military Appeals and the judge
Advocates General. 1971 AmNuA. REPoxT, supra note 3, at i-2.
"' The Task Force Report also has recommendations concerning Status of Forces agreements. Supra
note 125.
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